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INTRODUCTION
Judging from the recent spate of books and articles criticizing federal,
state, and even local regulation, I the regulatory apparatus in the United
States is broken. The literature chides regulators for applying their rules
woodenly, without considering whether application in a particular circum-
stance will further the goals the rules were meant to achieve.2 In addition,
commentary criticizes courts for holding agencies to exacting standards of
care in making regulatory decisions, forcing agencies to devote inordinate
time and resources to every decision.3 As a result, the critics inform us,
1. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS (1985) (proposing com-
munal property rights approach to zoning as means of improving local land use regulation);
JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990) (criticiz-
ing NHTSA's abandonment of its safety mission in favor of recall strategy); Richard B.
Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585
(1996) (criticizing current centralized command and control environmental regulations).
The current movement for regulatory reform has roots in economic analyses critiquing vari-
ous aspects of regulation. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973) (examin-
ing effect of economic market analyses on land use control systems); James E. Krier, The
Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. REV. 429
(1971) (analyzing effect of pollution on market and legal institutions). The movement,
however, has expanded beyond the ranks of legal academics, spawning a variety of federal
and state programs to reform traditional regulatory approaches. See Marianne Lavelle, The
'Property Rights' Revolt: Environmentalists Fret as States Pass Reagan-Style Takings Laws,
NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1993, at 1 (describing recent state efforts to curb-regulation by requir-
ing compensation for economic injury such regulation imposes on propert 'owners); Eric
W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1268-87 (1995) (describ-
ing "emergence of reflexive elements in current environmental law"); Jim Rossi, The 1996
Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: Revolution or Counter-Revolution?, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 345, 358 (1997) (describing Florida's reform of its administrative law as
driven by coalition of "advocates of flexibility and rationality" and those opposed to gov-
ernment attempts to regulate markets altogether).
2. A popularized account of this critique, PHILIP HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON
SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994), resonated sufficiently with the Ameri-
can populace that it reached the New York Times bestseller list for 29 weeks. See Best Sell-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, §7, at 18. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT iS TRANSFORMING THE
PUBLIC SECTOR (1992), for an earlier popularized call for reform of government regulation.
3. See R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 245, 247 (1992) (stating that courts' unclear and inconsistent requirements when re-
viewing agency rules have led to enormous increases in size of rulemaking records and in
length of rulemaking process); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419 (1992) [hereinafter McGarity, Deossifying]
(stating that stringent judicial review induces agencies to prepare for worst case scenarios,
an "extremely resource-intensive and time-consuming" effort); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven
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agencies have no choice but to compromise implementation of their fun-
damental statutory mandates. Some blame industry pursuit of private
benefits for undermining the public interest even as others lambast regula-
tors for imposing burdens on these same self-interested entities - burdens
that drive jobs and investments overseas. The death of regulatory common
sense has even led some contemporary Cassandras to predict catastrophes
for the United States economy.
5
The recent criticism of regulation has prompted several proposals to re-
turn the regulatory state to working order. Although these proposals take a
variety of forms, for many critics the solution is increasing administrators'
discretion and relieving them from onerous constraints on their use of coer-
cive regulatory powers.6 These critics see administrators as generally good
decisionmakers, or at least good enough that giving them carte blanche to
regulate is preferable to miring the economy down in a regulatory process
that cannot react quickly enough to the ever-changing technical, economic
and political environments in which regulated entities find themselves.
Those who propose increasing regulators' discretion to respond to regula-
tory problems focus on the rigidity of agency regulations and the judiciali-
zation of the process the agency uses to reach them.7 Statutory prescrip-
Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) (holding courts re-
sponsible for "ossification" of agency rulemaking because "courts have transformed the
simple, efficient notice and comment process into an extraordinary lengthy, complicated
process").
4. See THOMAS 0. McGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL AND SAFETY HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 257-58 (1993)
(contending that chronic delay in Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
promulgation,of health and safety standards results from overzealous judicial review); Rich-
ard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of
Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence ofAgency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 311
[hereinafter Pierce, Two Problems] (reporting replacement of systematic policymaking
through rulemaking with policy paralysis or ad hoc policymaking through adjudication); cf.
JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How
OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 1-17 (1988) (arguing that overly
strict regulation has caused slow pace of standard setting and unwillingness to regulate some
hazards).
5. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of
Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s,
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 7-9 (1991) [hereinafter Pierce, Unintended Effects] (predicting severe
electricity shortages due to judicial review discouraging and delaying rulemaking at FERC).
6. See HOWARD, supra note 2, at 180-82; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 2, at 108-
37; JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
Do IT 369-70 (1989) (noting that need to constrain government abuse limits extent to which
one can "deregulate government").
7. HOWARD, supra note 2, at 104-05; McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 3, at 1440-
41; cf JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS 192 (1983) (concluding that "traditional legal techniques for moderating
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tions and an agency's own substantive regulations bind the agency and can
interfere with the agency's ability to react reasonably to the circumstance in
which the statute or regulation must be implemented. Moreover, to the
extent an agency has discretion to alter the substantive rules that bind its
regulatory actions, cumbersome procedures can interfere with the agency's
ability and willingness to amend rules in a timely manner to fit particular
situations it faces.8
This Article evaluates the extent to which increasing administrative dis-
cretion is likely to result in more flexible regulation that serves the public
interest. Agency discretion is a nebulous concept. Discussions of increas-
ing discretion subsume more particular issues such as the extent to which
agencies can set policy, the freedom of agencies to deviate from established
policy in particular circumstances, and whether discretion is plenary rather
than subject to supervision by other institutions. 9 One cannot, however,
discuss these issues independently because increasing agency leeway with
respect to one issue necessarily alters the agency's freedom with respect to
another. For example, freedom to deviate from established policy, taken to
an extreme, allows an agency to change the policy by consistent detours
during implementation. Also, eliminating all review of agency decisions
formally would allow the agency complete freedom to set policy and devi-
ate from it. Of course internal decisionmaking norms at the agency may
mean that formal freedoms do not translate into a pragmatic ability to devi-
ate from past practices.' 0 Nonetheless, lack of supervision usually does al-
bureaucratization of [the SSD claims] decision processes are essentially bankrupt"). But see
KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 195-96 (abr. 3d ed.
1997) (contending that more structured rulemaking processes are necessary to ensure demo-
cratic accountability of this quasi-legislative function).
8. See Pierce, Unintended Effects, supra note 5, at 25 (noting that rulemaking proce-
dures and judicial review delayed FERC from putting into effect rules intended to allocate
natural gas during gas shortage until after shortage passed).
9. See Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299,
1303 (1997) (comparing German view of administrative discretion with American view of
supervision process).
10. See JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: How DECISIONS HAPPEN
60-61 (1994) (describing how an organization's behavioral rules are tied to self-identity of
members of organization); JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING
INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 21-23 (1989) (proposing that or-
ganizational behavior is governed by routines that may be formally dictated or "learned and
internalized through socialization or education"); cf JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A.
SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 160-61 (1958) (stating that many organization decisions are made
by routine response to outside stimuli, but also noting that influence of routine, rather than
explicit problem solving, is greatest "[w]hen a stimulus is of a kind that has been experi-
enced repeatedly in the past"). Recently, much legal commentary has focused on the influ-
ence of legal norms on individual behavior. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a
Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144
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ter somewhat the latitude an agency has to side-step existing policy. The
interrelationship between these aspects of discretion leads me to structure
my discussion according to the operational apparatus that one might use to
constrain discretion, while maintaining flexibility standards that cabin the
agency authority to set policy in the first place and ex-post review to mod-
ify agency decisions after they are made. I take care at all turns, however,
to consider the implications such means would have on the various aspects
of discretion identified above.
The Article begins by discussing the need for ex ante constraints on
agency decisionmaking in order to ensure that regulation is predictable and
democratically accountable. It first looks at the role of legally binding
rules to guide agency discretion, and the ability of regulators to deviate
from such rules to avoid perverse outcomes. It proceeds to describe the
role of institutional norms in agency decisionmaking, and to identify some
unique problems use of such norms imposes for permitting constrained
flexibility. The Article next addresses the need for ex-post review to en-
sure against several pathologies of agency decisionmaking. It evaluates the
potential for bottom-line outcome review of agency decisions to provide
workable constraints on agency discretion without forfeiting agency flexi-
bility. Finally, the Article evaluates the potential for review of the agency
decisionmaking process to provide such constraints, and suggests that judi-
cial review of agency reasoning is an important aspect of ensuring against
the identified pathologies.
I. EXANTE CONSTRAINTS ON AGENCY DISCRETION
Binding rules provide substantive limits on agency action prior to the
agency making a decision in a particular context - what I call ex ante con-
straints. Statutes impose such constraints when they mandate the explicit
action an agency must take under particular circumstances. The more par-
ticular and detailed the statutory provision, the less freedom an agency has
in applying its regulatory prescriptions in specific situations." Broad
statutory delegations of power to an agency to regulate a general area of the
U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) (focusing on effects of norms on various aspects of law and
economics). Social norms, enforced by community expressions of disapproval and atten-
dant opprobrium such community reaction engenders, provide one mechanism constraining
conduct that is not limited by formal legal rules. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTrES 141-43 (1991) (giving examples in
which norms dictated behaviors different from those imposed by legal rules); JON ELSTER,
THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 99-100 (1989).
1I. Cf Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 369, 393-408, 411-23 (1989) [hereinafter Rubin, Law and Legislation] (defending
jurisprudence of broad and vague statutory delegations and describing potential means for
Congress to ensure effectiveness of statutes creating such delegations).
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economy, characteristic of much legislation adopted under the New Deal
belief in agency expertise, impose few ex ante constraints on the agency.'
2
In contrast, statutes that provide rigorous formulae may preclude reason-
able regulation that balances social costs against benefits. 3
In addition to statutes, agency rules can also provide ex ante constraints
on agency regulatory discretion. If an agency is bound to follow its own
rules, and the process of amending rules is so protracted that the agency
cannot amend the rule in time to apply it to the prevailing problem, then the
agency will not be free to take into consideration unique attributes of the
factual circumstances facing the agency. The same result follows if agen-
cies are unable to amend rules because they simply do not have sufficient
resources to devote to the process or because the politics of the situation
makes the cost of amendment not worth the benefit.
Ex ante legal constraints dissolve as agencies gain discretion to waive
rules, make exceptions to them, or simply decline to enforce them in ap-
propriate circumstances. Reformers who bemoan the inflexibility of rule-
bound regulatory systems propose that agencies be allowed liberally to de-
viate from rules when common sense and good policy dictate.
14
A. The Tension Between the Need for Binding Rules and Agency
Discretion
Administrative law has long recognized a tension between the rule of
law and agency discretion to implement statutes. Rules as ex ante con-
straints on agency behavior serve several important functions. Foremost,
binding rules allow private entities to predict regulatory decisions and to
plan accordingly.' 5 Rules foster investment in productive enterprises by
12. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 43 (1988) (noting that often New Deal statutes "placed almost no limits"
on agency rulemaking authority); Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law:
Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 427, 427-30 (1989) (noting that "transfor-
mation in statutory practice accompanying the rise of the administrative state.., from direct
('transitive') legislative resolution of policy problems to indirect ('intransitive') resolution
through the empowerment of agents").
13. See MENDELOFF, supra note 4, at 7 (asserting that "[tihe statutory requirement to
set standards stringently makes it more difficult to justify them as sensible public policy").
14. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Ad-
ministrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 278 (examining agency exceptions to legislative
rules); Jim Rossi, Making Policy Through the Waiver of Regulations at the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 255, 258-60, 281-90 (1995) [hereinafter Rossi,
Making Policy] (supporting FERC's development of policy through grant of waivers statu-
tory requirements for independent power producers).
15. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-73 (1944); JEFFREY L.
JOWELL, LAW AND BUREAUCRACY: ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL
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reducing the risk that regulators will deem an activity prohibited. 16 In ad-
dition, rules can increase the efficiency of regulation. If different cases in-
volve the same relevant factual circumstances, then an agency can resolve
an issue raised by the cases once and for all by rule. 7 Otherwise, the
agency would have to redecide the issue in every adjudicatory proceeding.
Binding rules can also increase the democratic accountability of govern-
ment. Legislators are directly elected, giving statutory prescriptions a su-
perior democratic pedigree than that of agency decisions. Agency rule-
making requires some degree of public notoriety, which fosters executive
and legislative oversight of the policy the rule implements, and thereby
makes rules more democratically accountable than ad hoc agency deci-
sions.18 Rulemaking also creates the potential for more meaningful public
participation in the policy making process, which again bolsters the demo-
cratic foundation of agency rules.19
ACTION 13, 19-20 (1975); see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 20 (1962) (advocating that
initial grants of authority to agencies contain specific standards to provide predictability);
Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contem-
porary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 385, 398 (focusing on how public laws facilitate private
ordering "in that they restrain official arbitrariness that otherwise might interfere with indi-
vidual decisionmaking").
16. The greater uncertainty about whether an activity will be prohibited, inherent in a
system of ad hoc policy decisions, imposes risk costs for which investors demand a higher
rate of return. See RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 112-14 (1981). These costs, in turn, discourage investment by decreasing the net
present value of payoffs from such investment. See id. at 61-63, 175-78. In addition, use of
stable rules, rather than ad hoc decisions that reflect the best action in light of current beliefs
about social welfare, results in more optimal investment by discouraging entities from
making decisions based on predictions of future regulatory policy. See Finn E. Kydland &
Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85
J. POL. ECON. 473, 486 (1977).
17. See JOWELL, supra note 15, at 12 (noting justness of uniformity of rule applica-
tion); WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: POLITICS AND PROCESS 50 (1985)
(arguing that rulemaking enables agencies to "formulate and enforce policy" quicker and
cheaper than in adjudication); Glen 0. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: An-
other Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 516 (1970) (examining claims that administrative process over-
judicialized).
18. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 262 (3d ed. 1994); THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 304 (2d ed. 1979); see also WEST, supra note 17, at 187
(noting that use of rulemaking has on occasion "spurred especially strong opposition from
regulated interests and rebuke from Congress").
19. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 18, at 266; CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING:
How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 161-63 (1994). But see
WARREN, supra note 7, at 195-96, 202 (disputing that rulemaking is democratic because it
serves ends of powerful special interest groups).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
Rules, however, are by their nature over and under inclusive: They pro-
hibit some conduct that their promulgator would condone and allow other
conduct that the promulgator would condemn.20 Viewing such rules as le-
gally binding on the agency decisionmaker and therefore applying them to
the letter leads to decisions that, in the particular context in which the
agency applies them, may fail to promote the purposes of the regulations. 21
By conforming to the American self-image as a country governed by
"laws and not men," and thereby treating rules as binding on regulatory de-
cisions, government bureaucrats disable themselves from responding to the
unique character of circumstances in the cases before them. 22 Rules, after
all, are necessarily imperfect; they cannot take into account every factor
relevant to the appropriate disposition of a matter facing the agency.23
Proponents of decreased judicialization of regulatory apparatus would en-
courage government officials to ignore the letter of a rule to the extent nec-
essary to further its underlying purposes.
The tension between the "rule of law" and regulatory flexibility is not
new. 24 Belief in the rule of law underlies attempts throughout this century
to limit legislative delegation of law-making discretion to agencies, and the
unworkability of the non-delegation doctrine in the modem state, to a great
extent, reflects the necessity of regulatory flexibility.25 It is hard to argue
20. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REv. 341, 346-53 (1949) (examining development of equal protection and due pro-
cess in judicial and legislative actions).
2 1. See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM
OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 71-72 (1982) (examining assumptions and concerns
about precision in regulatory decisionmaking). The potential for rules to deviate from opti-
mal congruence with the desires of their promulgator will increase with increases in their
"transparency" - that is, the objectivity of their application in particular factual contexts.
See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73
(1983).
22. See PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION:
TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 64 (1978) (describing shortcomings of 'rule of law' approach).
23. See BARDACH& KAGAN, supra note 21, at 58.
24. The tension dates back at least as far as Aristotle's distinction between legal justice,
which derives from application of general rules, and equity, which corrects the imperfec-
tions of general rules. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 141-42 (Martin Ostwald ed. &
trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (n.d.). Many works addressing the fundamental nature of law
discuss this tension. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 144-47 (1986); F.A.
HAYEK, I LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 102 (1973); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGAR,
LAW IN A MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 192-200 (1976).
25. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 96-98 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Account-
ability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 391, 404-
05 (1987) [hereinafter Pierce, Political Accountability] (examining Professor Lowi's article
concerning adverse political consequences of broad delegations of power to agencies);
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against empowering regulators with greater flexibility to better serve the
purposes underlying regulation. Problems arise, however, when different
individuals characterize the purposes of a regulatory scheme.26
For example, Philip Howard's criticism of the rejection of Mother
Theresa's application to renovate a condemned apartment building and turn
it into a shelter for the homeless in New York City evokes much popular
sympathy.27 The city ordinance dictating that multistory buildings must
have elevators seems ludicrous when applied to Mother Theresa's proposal
instead of that of some slum lord providing substandard housing. But why?
Presumably, the absurdity occurs because one recognizes the waste of an
opportunity to put an unused building to good use by one whose motives in
doing so seem selfless. If our administrative system, however, directed
regulators to evaluate whether the rule serves a good purpose when applied
in this context, one could easily argue that regulators should approve reno-
vations of all unoccupied buildings regardless of whether they contain an
elevator.
If the cost of the elevator will increase the rents needed to justify the
renovation to the extent that no homeless would be able to afford to live in
the building, or more likely to the extent that the owner could not recoup
his investment from the social service agencies, then one can cogently ar-
gue that it is best to approve the building without an elevator. In that con-
text, as in the Mother Theresa example, requiring an elevator will mean the
building will not be renovated and will remain unused. It seems preferable
that those currently on the streets have some shelter even if it does not have
an elevator.28 And, if potential residents of a renovated building desire and
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1669, 1695-96 (1975) [hereinafter Stewart, Reformation] (focusing on expansion of, and
changes to, traditional model of agency discretion). Despite this recognized necessity, some
continue to urge renewal of the non-delegation doctrine as a means of reinstating account-
ability of the government to the public interest. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory
of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 63-64 (1982) (discussing public choice
perspectives and delegation authority); Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberal-
ism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 295, 297 (1987) [herein-
after Lowi, Two Roads] (reviewing politics of administrative agencies in relation to delgated
powers).
26. See NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 22, at 77-78.
27. See HOWARD, supra note 2, at 3-5.
28. This argument parallels the literature criticizing enforcement of housing codes and
the doctrine of warranty of habitability because such enforcement will reduce the supply of
low income housing. See RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 471-73 (4th
ed. 1992); see also WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1988) (performing regression analysis of empirical data and concluding
that habitability laws intended to benefit low income tenants cost these tenants more than
value of improvements laws prompted).
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can afford an elevator, presumably the market would induce the building
owners to install one.
Lest one surmise that this is an easy example because elevators are not
essential to decent housing, note that the same argument could apply to the
requirement that apartment buildings have heat and water and not be over-
crowded.29  The point is that giving regulators more discretion about
whether and how to apply a rule also allows the regulator discretion about
the weighing of the various purposes that may be said to underlie the rule.
Giving the regulator this discretion can compromise the relevant political
community's ability to mandate a standard that reflects its shared values,
such as the value that every individual should have housing of a certain
minimal quality. Giving unchecked discretion to regulators ultimately in-
creases flexibility, but it also allows ad hoc decisionmaking to undermine
the mission of the regulatory program that reformers seek to further.3 °
Thus, society must strike some balance between granting administrators
discretion to ignore substantive limits on their actions and constraining
their exercises of discretion.
B. Administrative Law's Current Balance Between Flexibility and
Constraint
The current administrative state already incorporates a balance between
the value of regulatory flexibility and the need for constraint of decision-
makers. The fundamental structure of administrative law today reflects a
consensus that, given the complexity of the modem world, the state cannot
operate if every major policy issue would have to be resolved by the legis-
lature and every legal standard announced by binding rule. The Supreme
Court's retreat from the non-delegation doctrine implicitly has accepted the
Weberian notion that bureaucratic decisionmaking permits purposive gov-
ernmental action in the complex modem state. 3' Throughout the modem
29. The tension between finding housing for the homeless and ignoring housing code
violations plays out, for example, in the actions of New York City homeless-diversion
workers who often "urge the poor to double and triple up with other families" in substan-
dard apartments because that is the only alternative to homelessness. See Deborah Sontag,
For Poor, Life 'Trapped in a Cage', N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1996, at Al; see also William
Fulton, Behind L.A. 's Homeless Crisis: Housing Codes for the '60s, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1994, at M6 (blaming homeless crisis in L.A. on lack of low income housing supply due in
part to outdated housing codes meant to combat substandard housing rather than lack of
housing).
30. See Nonet & Selznick, supra note 22, at 76; Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexi-
bility and the Administrative State, 32 TULSA L.J. 325, 335 (1996) (examining recent trend
in flexibility in relations with administrative agencies).
31. According to Weber:
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era of the regulatory state, administrators have had broad discretion to
adopt policies as they see fit to implement vaguely worded statutes. With
some notable exceptions, statutes today provide wide expanses for flexible
32
agency decisionmaking.
During the early years under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
the traditional model of administrative law sought to balance the tension
between discretion and constraint by requiring agencies to limit their own
discretion. The traditional model counseled that agencies should adopt
rules that bind their subsequent decisions.34 According to this model, if the
agency wants to establish a policy, then it should do so using the APA's
notice and comment procedures.35 If it needs to alter that policy, or provide
an exception within a factual context different from that it envisioned when
it adopted the rule, it should first amend its rule following the same proce-
Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administra-
tive organization ... is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the
highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known
means of carrying out imperative control over human beings.
MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 337 (A.M. Henderson
& Talcott Parsons eds. & trans., 1947).
32. See Lowi, Two Roads, supra note 25, at 295-96; Pierce, Political Accountability,
supra note 25, at 391-92; cf Rubin, Law and Legislation, supra note 11, at 374 (asserting
that, in modem administrative state, norm that legislature should exert political control over
administrative agencies does not invalidate broad delegation of rulemaking authority to
agencies under vague standards).
33. The traditional model is the product of application of the legal process school of
jurisprudence to administrative law. The legal process school advocated a middle ground
between formalism and realism that provided the underpinnings for the Federal Administra-
tive Procedures Act. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83, 92
(1994) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Syncopated Chevron] (requiring agencies to explain why
their interpretations of statutory scheme makes good policy); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassi-
cal Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 567, 576-77 (1992) (exploring trends
of returning to neoclassical model of administrative law). "The rule of law is central to the
traditional model .... " Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REv. 423, 460 (discussing modem efforts to reform federal administrative policymaking);
see also Sargentich, supra note 15, at 397 n.26.
34. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 55-
57 (1969); see also FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 145-46 (advocating that agencies adopt
more rules and policy statements to guide their discretion in adjudications); WARREN, supra
note 7, at 286-97 (discussing significance of Davis's position).
35. See Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedures Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 619-21 (1970) (analyzing relationship
between agency and rulemaking process); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921, 932
(1965) (evaluating modes utilized by agencies to formulate policy).
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dure. The agency, however, remains free to adopt and alter substantive
policy as it sees fit.
This traditional legal process-approach fails to respond to the propo-
nents of increased agency discretion because it would still force the agency,
in any particular situation, to conform with rules that may prove unwise in
that context. Even though the agency could adopt new policy to reflect
changed circumstances or knowledge that the original policy was not
working, adopting a new rule following the APA notice and comment pro-
cedures is cumbersome.36 Perhaps because agencies are not directly electo-
rally accountable, the process by which they develop legally binding rules
has become protracted. Without the ballot box to provide even the sem-
blance of public accountability, agencies rely instead on procedures that
allow participation by all affected by the rule.37 Furthermore, courts have
mandated that agencies must explain how their decisions comport with the
purposes and the constraints imposed by their authorizing statutes. As a
result, agencies often cannot alter rules on short notice to take into account
the latest understanding about a problem, or unforeseen circumstances in a
particular instance of rule application. Moreover, adopting rules by notice
and comment procedures is expensive, and the agency faces uncertainty
about whether a court will ultimately uphold a rule.39 Hence, agencies may
36. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Re-
sponse to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEx. L. REv. 525, 528 (1997) [hereinafter McGarity, Os-
sification of Rulemaking]. Currently, to promulgate a substantive rule an agency must com-
port with the procedural requirements of 20 statutes and executive orders, imposing over
100 independent "steps" in the rulemaking process. See REQUIREMENTS FOR
ADMINiSTRATIVE RULEMAKING (unpublished document prepared by Mark Seidenfeld for
ABA Section on Administrative Law, Committee on Rulemaking) (on file with author)
(summarizing on one page grid, followed by seven pages of elaboration, procedural re-
quirements imposed on agencies by statutes and executive orders).
37. See Donald R. Brand, Reformers of the 1960s and 1970s: Modern Anti-
Federalists?, in REMAKING AMERICAN POLITICs 27, 37 (Richard A. Harris & Sidney M.
Milkis eds., 1989); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173, 182-83 (1997) [hereinafter
Rossi, Mass Participation] (showing effect of mass participation in agency policymaking);
Stewart, Reformation, supra note 25, at 1761.
38. See American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402,
413 (1983) (asserting adequacy of agency's examination of rules); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (examining legality of judicial review of
agency actions); C.K. v. New Jersey Dep't of HHS, 92 F.3d 171, 182 (1996) (discussing
Secretary's grant of waiver of compliance with federal laws); cf. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 645-46 (1990) (rejecting requirement that agency con-
sider factors that reflect policies within statutes other than one authorizing its action, where
authorizing statute gives agency power to take action "appropriate and consistent with its
duties under this title," i.e., the authorizing act).
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shy away from amending rules in response to changes in circumstances that
render the existing rules unsuitable.
The courts, however, rarely have heeded the legal process admonition
that agencies should be required to limit their own discretion by rule. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that agencies can make policy by ad-
judication as well as by rulemaking.40 Agencies can even announce new
policies through non-binding statements of policy without resorting to any
procedures other than publication of the statement in the Federal Regis-
ter.41 Moreover, an agency enjoys latitude to write waiver provisions into a
rule, which allows the agency to deviate from the rule when its application
42would undermine the policies the rule means to promote. In addition,
39. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment ofAgency Rulemaking: An Essay
on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter &
Spring 1994, at 185-86 [hereinafter Mashaw, Agency Rulemaking] (streamlining agency
rulemaking process); Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65
TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1290 (1987) (critiquing procedures agencies use to implement regula-
tory actions); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals
to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REv. 483, 492
(1997) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Demystifying].
40. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974). Twice the Supreme Court has intimated that agencies might
have to adopt rules prior to applying a policy to a person's detriment. In NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), the NLRB used an order resolving an adjudication to an-
nounce a change in a long standing policy, but decided not to apply the new policy to the
parties in that particular adjudication. The Supreme Court reversed, intimating that rules are
the appropriate vehicle for announcing prospective regulatory changes. Id. at 763-65. In
light of Bell Aerospace, which the Court decided only five years after Wyman-Gordon and
which upheld the NLRB's adoption of a new policy in an adjudication, Wyman-Gordon is
better viewed as holding only that an agency cannot use an adjudication to make policy that
it then does not apply in that adjudication. In Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974), the
Bureau of Indian affairs attempted to limit statutorily provided assistance to Indians living
on a reservation, relying on a guideline published in its internal Manual. The Supreme
Court reversed and suggested that the Bureau could not rely on the Manual because it had
not adopted it as a legislative rule. Although Morton can be read to suggest that agencies
cannot make new policy except by rulemaking, it is usually viewed today as holding only
that an agency cannot rely on a non-legislative rule as legally binding.
41. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manu-
als, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J.
1311, 1313-14 (1992) [hereinafter Anthony, Interpretive Rules] (arguing that agencies abuse
such rules to coerce private conduct); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41
DUKE L.J. 1463, 1467 (1992) (coining term "publication rulemaking" for such documents
and noting need for such rules).
42. See Rossi, Making Policy, supra note 14, at 266 n.48 (noting that FERC's authority
under Federal Power Act to grant waivers in public interest has even allowed FERC to ex-
empt some entities from what appear to be regulatory requirements under Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act); see also Breger, supra note 30, at 340-44 (discussing waivers as
means of achieving regulatory flexibility). In general, an agency need not provide a safety
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unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise, agencies enjoy plenary legal
43discretion to refuse to enforce rule or statutory violations. Finally, agency
managers usually are adept at utilizing informal ties that they have devel-
oped over many years, with those outside the agency, to achieve the
agency's regulatory mission in the face of formal constraints that would in-
hibit that achievement." Thus, those who suggest that regulators today are
substantively rule-bound may have overstated the extent to which the ter-
rain of regulatory law is too confining.
C. Congress's Increasing Propensity to Micromanage Agency Policy
I do not mean to deny that sometimes statutes limit the ability of agen-
cies to devise standards for a particular context or tailor decisions to fit the
needs of a particular regulated entity.45 But, to the extent that regulatory
valve allowing it to waive a rule in a particular context. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners
Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 601 n.44 (1981) (holding that Federal Communications Act require-
ment that FCC provide formal hearing in licensing proceeding, does not necessitate that
FCC provide opportunity for applicant to show that it should be excepted from binding
standard governing such licensing). Nonetheless, in several cases courts have rejected
challenges to agency rules as arbitrary and capricious only because the agency promised to
consider waiving the rules in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Nuclear Info. Resource
Serv. v. NRC, 969 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1992); P & R Temmer v. FCC, 743 F.2d 918, 929
(D.C. Cir. 1984). These cases indicate the significance the courts, and society generally,
place on an agency's ability to grant a waiver to rules when the agency deems such a waiver
appropriate.
43. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (holding that agency decision
not to enforce rule is unreviewable because decision was traditionally committed to agency
discretion); see also Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative
Law, 74 MINN. L. REv. 689, 719 (1990) (contending that distinction in Heckler v. Chaney
does not hinge on simple dichotomy between agency action and inaction); Jim Rossi, Waiv-
ers, Flexibility and Reviewability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359, 1366, 1371 (1997) (noting
that courts review agency grants of waivers from rules, but often do not review denials of
such waivers). But cf Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with
Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1187, 1196 (1997) (noting that some
courts have reviewed agency decisions not to enforce statute or rule based on allegations
that decision not to enforce was inconsistent with existing rules).
44. See Ralph S. Brower & Mitchel Y. Abolafia, Procedural Entrepeneurship: Enact-
ing Alternative Channels to Administrative Effectiveness, 26 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 287,
292-300 (1996) (describing several strategies public managers use to overcome external
constraints on decisionmaking).
45. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Contracts and Covenants: A United States
Perspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS: NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR A
REALISTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY? 143, 144-45 (Jan M. van Dunnd ed., 1993) (describing
how detailed nature of environmental statutes and ability of private individuals to enforce
statutory obligations create significant barriers to governmental agencies and regulated enti-
ties negotiation of facility specific agreements that would relieve entity from having to
comply with more general environmental regulations).
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imperfections arise from an attempt to balance flexibility and accountabil-
ity by ex ante mandating criteria for decisions, the culprit seems to be an
increased mood in Congress that detailed policy should be made by stat-
ute.46 The problem is not the structure of administrative law imposed by
courts, but the reaction of the politically accountable branches to com-
plaints about burdensome agency regulation. Nonetheless, the propensity
of Congress to micromanage agency decisionmaking does interfere with
regulators' flexibility to structure their responses to the particular circum-
stances they face.
Political dissatisfaction with agency performance has, of late, led Con-
gress to provide very detailed statutory prescriptions for regulatory prob-
lems.47 Despite the details, however, Congress tends to write statutory pre-
scriptions to cover broad rather than particular regulatory contexts. Hence,
such standards exacerbate the problems of over and under inclusiveness of
rules. In addition, statutory standards derive from a political process that
downplays the importance of technical knowledge and deliberation, and in-
stead emphasizes ideological interests and the preferences of special inter-
est groups.48 This process promotes adoption of unrealistically strict stan-
dards, which symbolically satisfies the ideologues, but limits enforcement
authority or funding, which placates entities subject to the standards. 49 As
46. Ironically, the congressional mood for prescribing agency discretion stems from the
same concern that has prompted some commentators to call for increasing agency discretion
- the ineffectiveness of regulatory government in the face of powerful interest group pres-
sures. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 2, at 166-68 (noting problems that stem from charac-
terizing regulation as securing rights of various interest groups). The difference between the
congressional and academic response may be that Congress views agencies but not itself as
being illegitimately subject to such pressure, while academics view all governmental insti-
tutions as tainted by special interest politics. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and
the Courts: 1967 - 1983, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1039, 1053 (1997).
47. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 828 (noting trend toward
more detailed statutory prescriptions of regulatory matters); Richard J. Lazarus, The Ne-
glected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who
Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at
205, 228 [hereinafter Lazarus, Neglected Question]; Steven Shimburg, Checks and Bal-
ances: Limitations on the Powers of Congressional Oversight, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1991, at 241, 247.
48. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REv. 1511, 1544-45 (1992) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Civic Republican].
49. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311, 328-29
[hereinafter Lazarus, Tragedy of Distrust] (describing how those who supported cleaning up
environment got Congress to pass strict laws reflecting their aspirations, while those skepti-
cal of environmental regulation managed to keep Congress from funding EPA sufficiently to
substantially implement these laws); Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 47, at 222-24
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a result, detailed statutory standards frequently pose a dilemma for imple-
menting agencies; they can enforce standards that may be inappropriately
structured for the situation at hand, often at great sacrifice to other parts of
the agency's regulatory program, or ignore violations of the statutory man-
dates altogether.50 If this dilemma is not enough to counsel against primary
reliance on statutory standards, the rigidity of such standards is reinforced
by the difficulty of getting Congress to amend a statute which is not work-
ing well. Even the cumbersome rulemaking process provides greater op-
portunity for prompt action than does the legislative process. 5'
In addition to promulgating detailed statutory standards, Congress has
also driven agencies to rely on rulemaking in contexts and over time-
frames that often prove counterproductive.5 2 In several recent regulatory
programs, Congress has codified the legal process approach to constraining
(contending that political benefits of environmental regulation led Congress to pass "series
of dramatic and uncompromising environmental statutes," but costs of implementing envi-
ronmental regulation encouraged some in Congress to criticize EPA for regulatory excesses
in enforcing these laws).
50. For the classic explanation of how overly strict standards can lead to underregula-
tion, see generally MENDELOFF, supra note 4. Perhaps the best known example of an under-
enforced strict standard involves the Delaney Clause of the Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §
348(c)(3) (1994), which prohibits the Food and Drug Administration from approving any
food additive that causes cancer in humans or animals. Because the Delaney Clause has the
potential to require the FDA to ban many useful products that pose at most a small risk of
cancer, the FDA has interpreted the clause so that it makes "no meaningful contribution to
cancer protection." FRANK B. CROSs, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW:
RISKS, REGULATION, AND VICTIM COMPENSATION 144 (1989). See generally Richard A.
Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional
Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1988) (de-
scribing how FDA minimized affect of Delaney Clause on its approval of food additives).
51. Despite these formidable drawbacks, Marshall Breger lauds "[cjlearer and more
precise statutory directives" as a means of ensuring accountability in flexible regulatory
schemes. Breger, supra note 30, at 345. I fail to see, and Breger does not explain, how such
ex ante constraints permit a meaningful degree of regulatory flexibility.
52. Requiring that agencies adopt rules by statutorily specified deadlines is an example
of a procedural ex ante constraint. Some scholars contend that such procedural constraints
allow Congress to ensure fidelity to the interests of the coalition responsible for enacting the
legislation without dictating substantive outcomes that might later prove unwise. See, e.g.,
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435-38 (1989);
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Con-
trol, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 253-64 (1987). There is little reason to believe, however,
that Congress can impose ex-ante procedural and structural controls that effectively con-
strain agency discretion. See David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-
making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 421-
30 (1997). See generally Glen 0. Robinson, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements
and the Political Control of Agencies ": Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L.
REv. 483 (1989).
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agency discretion by requiring the agency administering the program to
adopt rules by statutorily prescribed deadlines. 3 Such deadlines induce
agencies to misappropriate their resources because agencies must focus
their regulatory efforts on rules prompted by litigation to enforce statutory
deadlines, rather than on rules aimed at ameliorating the most serious
problems within the agencies' statutory mandate. 4 Statutory deadlines can
also prompt agencies to hurry their rulemakings and thereby adopt ill-
conceived regulations. 5 Congress has also authorized citizen suits allow-
ing private entities to seek penalties for rule and statutory violations -
suits that can significantly interfere with regulators' enforcement policies.56
Like Congress, the President has also attempted to impose ex ante con-
straints on regulators. To the extent allowed by particular statutes, execu-
tive orders have required agencies to adopt regulations that maximize net
social benefits as identified by cost-benefit analyses.57  Competition be-
tween Congress and the President for control over administrative programs
53. See Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines:
A Cost-Benefit Appraisal, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 172 n.I (1987) (listing areas of regulation
in which Congress has mandated agencies to adopt rules by statutory deadlines).
54. See Abbott, supra note 53, at 171; see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 19-20 (1993) (highlighting problem
of "random agenda selection" and attributing it in part to agencies responding to public
pressures).
55. See Abbott, supra note 53, at 171-72; see also Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Re-
view: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric
Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 763, 793-800 (describing how FERC used adjudicatory
proceedings and conditions on licenses to work-out some cost allocation problems created
by deregulating generation of electric power).
56. See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Pre-
liminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV.
833, 891 (1985) (stating that "private enforcement actions might well disrupt or challenge
the network of [enforcement] norms, assumptions and understandings that have grown up
within the EPA and its counterpart state agencies"); cf Michael I. Krauthamer, Note, Public
Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.: Undetectable Injury, a Loophole in
Citizen Suit Standing, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 837, 851-54 (arguing that citizen suit provision of
Clean Water Act empowers citizens unable to prove measurable injury in fact to bring ac-
tions against violators of Act when government chooses not to exercise discretionary en-
forcement power).
57. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R 638 (1994), reprinted at 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994). Clinton's mandate that regulations be justified by a cost-benefit calculus is the lat-
est in a series of executive orders, dating back to the Nixon presidency, mandating that
agencies perform some sort of cost-benefit analysis. For a description of the history of these
executive orders, see Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Over-
sight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991,
at 127, 129-55.
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has exacerbated the propensity of the political branches to micromanage
agency decisionmaking
5 8
The political branches, however, need the ability to constrain agencies
by specific statutory or executive directive to ensure that agency decisions
do not reflect values inconsistent with consensus values of the polity. For
example, in the face of the Reagan EPA's strong stand against implement-
ing environmental laws,59 Congress could justify forcing the agency to
regulate by detailing regulatory prescriptions, requiring rulemaking by spe-
cific deadlines, and authorizing citizen suits to enforce statutory mandates.
Such legislation was needed to prevent the agency from utilizing its discre-
tion to undermine the preference of the polity for stronger environmental
regulation. 6° In the context of an administration willing to implement the
laws in good faith, however, these provisions are counter-productive.
Several proposed reforms would help alleviate problems caused by
overly restrictive statutory prescriptions. First, Congress should avoid the
temptation to write specific regulatory standards into statutes when such
provisions are not needed to constrain a runaway agency. Authorizing and
appropriatiog, committee oversight usually permits Congress to communi-
cate its concerns effectively to an agency without hamstringing the agency
with inflexible statutory provisions.6' Second, Congress should not impose
enforceable rulemaking deadlines on agencies without having determined
58. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory
Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 20 (1994) [hereinafter Shapiro, Political Oversight].
59. See generally JONATHAN LASH ET AL., THE STORY OF THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION'S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT: A SEASON OF SPOILS (1984); see also
RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE
OF Two AGENCIES 258 (2d ed. 1996).
60. See Michael E. Kraft, A New Environmental Policy Agenda: The 1980 Presidential
Campaign and its Aftermath, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s: REAGAN'S NEW
AGENDA 29, 45-47 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1984) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY] (reporting that opinion polls during congressional campaign of
1982 and into 1983 consistently indicated that large majority of Americans opposed
Reagan's environmental policies).
61. For a description of Congress's means of overseeing agency policy, see JAMES W.
FESLER & DONALD F. KETTL, THE POLITICS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 273-76
(1991). The efficacy of such oversight assumes that the preferences of committee members
parallel those of Congress as a whole. When members of committees with authority to
oversee agency activities are "preference outliers," ex ante statutory constraints may provide
a means of limiting iron triangles between the oversight committee, the agency and the
regulated industry that leads to agency capture. See Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to
Control Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 101, 120 (1997). Assuming that the whole Congress is more representative
of the entire polity than is any particular committee, such a situation is a special instance of
the need for legislation to keep agency action within bounds consistent with the views of the
general polity.
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that the matters addressed by the required rules are imperative. Third, even
when Congress finds it necessary, or perhaps politically expedient, to pro-
vide detailed regulatory provisions, it should consider allowing agencies to
exempt particular entities or classes of entities from these provisions if the
agency can persuasively demonstrate that applying those provisions would
not serve the announced public purposes of the statute.
62
Courts too can help eliminate the worst impact from statutory
micromanagement. They should recognize that agencies need freedom to
avoid perverse consequences from detailed statutory prescriptions and,
therefore, should allow agencies significant leeway to interpret statutes in
light of their underlying purposes. In Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. ,63 the Supreme Court appeared to have rec-
ognized a broad domain for agency discretion in statutory interpretation. 64
Unfortunately, in the fourteen years since Chevron, many courts have re-
stricted that domain using controversial and, by the thesis above, ill
founded resort to strained textual readings of statutes. 65 A reinforcement of
62. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 193-95 (1999) (proposing that EPA be
allowed to "reform" statutory provisions if it determines that such provisions applied to a
particular class of entities, is unnecessary or prohibitively costly"). The Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977 provides an example of this flexible approach to regulation. That Act
allows exemptions of mines from safety standards if the Secretary determines that an alter-
native to meeting a standard "guarantee[s] no less than the same measure of protection af-
forded by such a standard, or that application of such standard ... will result in the diminu-
tion of safety to the miners .... 30 U.S.C. § 81 l(c) (1994).
63. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
64. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65, 105 (noting that Chevron signaled to lower courts
Supreme Court's desire to allow greater agency discretion in interpreting statutes). Overall,
lower courts initially read Chevron as such a signal. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990
DuKE L.J. 984, 1029-36 (presenting evidence that Chevron increased appellate court affir-
mances, and reduced reversals and remands, of agency statutory interpretation).
65. See Seidenfeld, Syncopated Chevron, supra note 33, at 119-24. Some have argued
that textualism is justified because legislative history is fiction. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68
(1994); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Due L.J. 511, 517. Others have questioned whether legislative history is a reliable indica-
tor of congressional understanding of statutes it passes. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489
U.S. 87, 98-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the
Use of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 371, 376-77. John Manning recently has argued
that textualism is justified as a means of preventing Congress from self-delegating the abil-
ity to influence legal interpretation to congressional committees. See John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 718-19 (1997). But
courts have gone beyond refusing to look at legislative history and have even refused to ad-
mit a meaning well within the general understanding allowed by text in order to overturn an
agency interpretation. See Richard J. Pierce, The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism:
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the original judicial understanding of Chevron as a signal that in all but the
clearest cases agencies should have discretion to interpret statutes as the
current regulatory environment requires would go far towards unburdening
regulations from anachronistic and otherwise overly restrictive prescrip-
tions.
66
The recent move by Congress to micromanage agency decisionmaking
by providing detailed ex ante prescriptions is not the only culprit causing
inflexible decisionmaking. Although agencies are not free to ignore stat-
utes, they do have significant leeway to interpret them to allow necessary
67regulation. Agencies also frequently can offer special treatment to coop-
erative entities willing to go beyond conduct the agency can require under
its authorizing statute,68 or the agency can use its authorized powers to
twist the arms of entities unwilling to cooperate.69 Agency flexibility to
use waivers, enforcement discretion, and arm-twisting, however, will not
help if the internal norms of the agency itself are not conducive to flexibil-
ity.
II. NORMS AS INFLEXIBLE RULES FOR AGENCY DECISIONS
In addition to constraining agency discretion, rules can facilitate agency
exercise of that discretion. A facilitative rule need not be a formal state-
ment limiting an agency's actions; it may be a norm, convention, or stan-
An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 749, 766-74 (1995). Using such a hyper-textual technique to restrict the discretion of
the executive branch is not justified by any of the traditional defenses of textualism. See
Seidenfeld, Syncopated Chevron, supra note 33, at 120; cf. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge
is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the
Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 350 (1990) (suggesting that con-
cers about abuses from court's use of legislative history do not apply with equal force to
agency use of such history because agency is disciplined by continuing relationships with
White House and Congress and its committees).
66. One might still retain meaningful judicial review over agency statutory interpreta-
tion by having courts review the reasoning of the agency interpretative process, and remand
interpretations that the agency could not adequately justify in light of the decisionmaking
record. See Seidenfeld, Syncopated Chevron, supra note 33, at 127-28.
67. Even with courts reading Chevron narrowly, it remains a durable symbol that
courts should consider deferring to agency interpretations of statutes. See Ronald M. Levin,
The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1253, 1258-59
(1997).
68. See Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13
YALE J. ON REG. 535, 558-95 (1996) (surveying current uses of cooperative regulation).
69. See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations ofAuthority, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 873, 876-95 (surveying forms of arm-twisting
used by federal agencies). Arm-twisting is controversial, however, precisely because it al-
lows an agency to evade "substantive limitations on [its] delegated authority." Id. at 875.
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dard that the agency uses to guide its decisionmaking. Any agency re-
sponse to a situation that follows from placing the facts of the situation into
predetermined categories such that the placement leads to a unique decision
involves application of a "rule."70 But, even defined as mere guides that
make the agency decisionmaking task tractable, rules still can interfere with
the flexibility of regulation by leading the agency to ignore particularities
of the circumstances facing it that might warrant the agency deviating from
its established norms.
A. Norms as Means of Guiding Agency Discretion
Agencies, like other organizations, rely on rules to simplify the deci-
sionmaking process.71 Rather than have to reanalyze the implications of a
decision for each situation, the agency can instead focus on which rule to
apply and how to apply it. But simplification alone is not inherently valu-
able; the simplification must serve the agency's ultimate goals. Rules can
serve such goals in a number of ways.
First, rules often develop to reflect an agency's feedback from regulatory
outcomes in previous situations. They are developed and handed down as
routines that govern the organization's behavior in a manner that avoids
unpleasant outcomes. 72 Rules so developed allow an agency to utilize its
learned experience in an efficient and coherent manner.
70. Rule application can occur at any point in the decisionmaking process. Agencies
rely on "rules," used in the broad sense I have described, when they decide what issues to
address, who will make the decision, what information is relevant to the decision and what
outcome follows from the information. See Xueguang Zhou, Organizational Decision
Making as Rule Following, in ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 257, 259 (Zur Shapira
ed., 1997).
71. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 31-32 (1984) (finding
that simple rules of decisionmaking outperform complex models in some game experi-
ments); Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560,
565-67 (1983) (noting that organizations develop simple predictable behavior, i.e., norms, in
response to the complexity of decisional situation); see also HERBERT A. SIMON,
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 118-19 (4th ed. 1997) (describing how administrators "satis-
fice" to simplify decisions and focus their attention on factors they consider crucial).
72. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 99 (1982) (asserting that routinization of activity provides most impor-
tant form of storage of organization's operational knowledge); Barbara Levitt & James G.
March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REV. Soc. 319, 323, 327-29 (1988) (describing
how experiential knowledge becomes part of organization's memory); cf Robert Axelrod,
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1095, 1109 (1986) (stating that
using computer simulations to show how learning from experience can lead to norms, but
demonstrating also that without "metanorm" or some other external mechanism for sup-
porting norm, how norms created by such learning can collapse).
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Second, rules can relieve tensions that derive from agency managers'
monitoring subordinates' decisions.73 A director of an office within an
agency can more easily check to ensure that a subordinate correctly applied
a rule than she can reassess an ad hoc decision. More importantly, the em-
ployee is not likely to feel specially singled out or punished when the di-
rector monitors for compliance with rules.
Third, rules can decrease the need for monitoring behavior. In fact, if
rules are sufficiently pervasive that all behavior becomes routinized, so lit-
tle discretion is left to agency staff members that the need for hierarchical
structure over particular applications vanishes.74 Rules also allow an
agency to resolve uncertainty in a predictable and efficient manner.75
Decisionmakers often face uncertainty about how information relates to the
desirability of their choices. Does a study that shows a slight increase in
laboratory rats' cancer rates at exposure levels a hundred times greater than
would be experienced by any human support approving a food additive?
One could argue that point either way. A rule mandating a ban on any food
additive that increases cancer rates in laboratory animals would resolve the
uncertainty about the import of this information. By restricting the uni-
verse of relevant categories, and thereby sometimes the universe of relevant
information, rules allow agencies to reach a predictable outcome.76
B. The Potential for Norms to Lead to Non-optimal Decisions
Although regulatory agencies impose most facilitative rules on them-
selves in the form of decisionmaking norms, and can change them without
invoking any formal procedure, such norms can cause agencies to make
non-optimal decisions.77 Organizations tend to follow such norms un-
73. See ALvIN W. GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY 177 (1954)
(noting ability of norms to decrease tension created by managerial oversight).
74. See MICHEL CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 53 (1964) (describing
how, in French civil service, routinization obviates need for supervisors to exercise direct
authority over those in their charge).
75. See Zhou, supra note 70, at 261.
76. See MARCH, supra note 10, at 89 (noting that rules are rigid precisely because they
are meant to make rule-based actions predictable to others); Heiner, supra note 71, at 570-
71 (ascribing development of predictable behavior, i.e., norms, to limitations on
organization's ability to select maximally desirable alternatives and uncertainty of how in-
formation affects such outcomes).
77. See MARCH, supra note 10, at 82-91 (explaining how biases in recalling and evalu-
ating experiences, as well as in interpreting feedback regarding outcomes to which rule ap-
plication leads, can result in development of maladaptive rules); Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning
from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 268, 273-76 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
(explaining how feedback from outcomes can reinforce sub-optimal decisionmaking rules);
[51:2
thinkingly.7 8 That is precisely the point: The agency uses the norm to avoid
having to devote resources to thinking through the particular decision in
light of every factor that potentially might bear on its wisdom. Moreover,
norms tend to outlive their usefulness. 79 An agency usually will not alter
decisionmaking norms unless it faces a crisis which vividly calls into ques-
tion the benefit of these norms,80 or the structure of the agency changes to
include individuals whose backgrounds lead them to use different norms
and hence question the ones the agency has traditionally used,81 or an ex-
ternal monitor, such as the President, Congress, or the courts, imposes a
constraint that requires the agency to alter these norms.
82
There is a need for a balance in an agency's strict reliance on internal
norms. To the extent a norm represents a simplification of the decision-
making process based on an agency's analytic evaluation of its past experi-
ence, use of the norm may provide an efficient means for the agency to
bring its expertise to bear on the problem. The ability of the agency to
translate experience into such simplifying norms forms much of the foun-
dation of the expertise rationale for delegating power to the agency in the
first place. 83 But, efficiency gains are offset by the costs attributable to the
Heiner, supra note 71, at 568-70 (describing how evolutionary process for developing rules
that govern human behavior may not result in optimal behavior and may even allow dys-
functional behavior to persist); cf Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1711-25 (1996) (arguing that social norms, in general, can be inef-
ficient).
78. See Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 2079, 2084 (1996) (suggesting that habits that dictate choice, i.e., deci-
sionmaking norms, can reflect mindless repetition).
79. See B. Guy PETERS, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 98-99
(3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter PETERS, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY]; FRANCIS E. ROURKE,
BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 30 (2d ed. 1976).
80. See Zhou, supra note 70, at 278.
8 1. Cf DOUGLAS YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY
AND EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 132 (1982) (asserting that "the force of [guild-
like] professionalism is diminished by conflict among various professional groups over the
shape and substance of policy").
82. See Zhou, supra note 70, at 268 (noting influence of external legal requirements on
internal decisionmaking norms); cf Errol E. Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical
Outline, 9 LAW & POL'Y 355, 370-72 (1987) (noting that statutes and court decisions can
help structure agency's regulatory culture, but cannot dictate that culture uniquely).
83. According to one of the most influential proponents of the expertise rationale for
administrative agencies, and the legal-academic father of the New Deal, James Landis, "ex-
pertness cannot derive [other than from a long continuance in office]. It springs only from
that continuity of interest, that ability and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year after
year, to a particular problem." JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938);
see also ROURKE, supra note 79, at 15 (stating that "[d]ealing day in and day out with the
same tasks gives public agencies an invaluable kind of practical knowledge that comes from
experience"); cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
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norm precluding the agency from adjusting its decision to particular cir-
cumstances." Hence, whether use of the norm is beneficial will depend on
the agency's past experiences and the particular circumstances it faces. To
the extent the norm merely allows an agency to avoid having to resolve un-
certainty, the desirability of its use will also depend on particular circum-
stances.
In addition to knowledge borne of experience, agencies are given broad
regulatory power because they have professional expertise and the capabil-
ity to implement technical regulatory requirements.85 In particular, the
delegation of decisionmaking to agencies is premised at least in part on
their ability to collect and analyze information and to understand the tech-
nical issues relevant to the decision agencies face.8 6 Again, a norm that re-
lieves the agency of collecting and analyzing data in a particular context
may lead the agency to reach a non-optimal outcome. This in itself does
not mean that use of the norm is not desirable, because collection and
analysis of data takes time and resources. If, however, the benefit that
would flow from a decision that reflected such collection and analysis of
information exceeds the costs of collection and analysis, then use of the
norm is counterproductive. Similarly, use of decisionmaking norms to de-
crease monitoring costs is detrimental if the resulting decisions under the
norm deviate from the optimal decision more than is justified by the de-
creased costs.
Generally, it is difficult for an agency or an external monitor to know
when use of a norm is justified. On the one hand, professionals trained to
solve a class of regulatory problems may force a particular problem into an
inappropriate decisionmaking structure with which they are familiar merely
because solutions within that structure exist.8 7 On the other hand, those
151-53 (1991) (deferring to Secretary of Labor's interpretation of his regulation, rather than
interpretation of OSHRC, because Secretary's involvement with every day enforcement al-
lows him to develop expertise that explains, in part, Congress's delegation of law making
functions to Secretary).
84. Cf William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of
Pandas' Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25, 36-37
(1993) (analogizing some maladaptations in law to those in evolution that occur when
adaptation that serves species will in one environment proves to be liability in changed envi-
ronment).
85. See ROURKE, supra note 79, at 16-17.
86. See B. GuY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 225-26 (4th ed. 1995) [here-
inafter PETERS, BUREAUCRACY].
87. See Einhorn, supra note 77, at 273-76. Similar concerns - that bureaucrats im-
mersed in the task of solving a single social problem may lack the balanced perspective
needed for sound policy decisionmaking - have prompted arguments for retaining judicial
review by generalist courts despite the inefficiency of such review by generalists. See Har-
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outside the profession may not understand the basis for the norm at all.
Thus, a reviewer almost has to perform the analysis that the norm obviates
in order to know for sure whether use of the norm was unwise. Sometimes,
however, one can identify a systematic bias introduced by use of a deci-
sionmaking heuristic. 88 When a heuristic leads to such a bias, regulatory
decisions may consistently err on one side of optimal outcomes. This con-
sistency may compound the degree to which decisions deviate from opti-
mality. For example, suppose the EPA, in setting an allowable level of a
particular pollutant, must determine the effects of given levels of a toxin in
the blood, the extent to which exposure to the pollutant leads to absorption
of the toxin, and the extent to which individuals are exposed to the pollut-
ant.89 If the EPA uses a norm that dictates caution in setting allowable
pollution levels and therefore resolves the uncertainties in each of the three
determinations in favor of greater protection of health, then the EPA will
establish a standard that may be greatly more restrictive than health con-
cerns warrant, even given the EPA's preference for resolving uncertainty to
favor greater protection.
C. The Difficulty with Ex Ante Prescriptions ofAgency Norms
Reliance on internal norms as rules poses a difficult problem for the
structure of administrative government. Norms that affect decisionmaking
are pervasive. 90 They enter the agency at every level at which formal and
informal decisions are made, from the agency's formation of an under-
standing of its regulatory role to the decision about whether and how to en-
force particular regulatory provisions against a single entity in a particular
context. Agency decisionmakers often are not conscious that they are re-
lying on such norms. 91 In addition, the factors that affect whether reliance
old H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 331-32
(1991) [hereinafter Bruff, Specialized Courts].
88. The cognitive psychology of decisionmaking has identified a host of systematic
biases caused by individuals' reliance on heuristics. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahne-
man, Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124-31 (1974);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453-58 (1981).
89. In setting the primary national ambient air quality standard for lead, the EPA in fact
did have to resolve all three of these decisions to determine the level at which borne lead
will have an adverse impact on health. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1138-
45 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming EPA's lead NAAQS).
90. See Zhou, supra note 70, at 259; see also RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH,
A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 112 (1963) (noting that "[t]he way in which the or-
ganization searches for alternatives is substantially a function of the operating rule it has").
91. See ELSTER, supra note 10, at 100 (asserting that "[tihe operation of [social] norms
is to a large extent blind, compulsive, mechanical or even unconscious").
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on a norm is desirable vary with the details of the circumstances surround-
ing an agency decision. It is the very complexity and relevancy of such
details that determines whether reliance on a decisionmaking norm is desir-
able. Hence dictating, ex ante, the norms on which an agency may rely and
when the agency should rely on these norms is impracticable. Ex ante con-
straints on use of such norms will not work.
A more promising approach would attempt to structure the agency to
avoid having a dominant set of norms that result in systematically biased
outcomes. For decisions involving political judgments, as most regulatory
decisions do at some level, the structure should guard against norms that
implement values inconsistent with those shared by the polity generally.
For example, one might incorporate into the Army Corps of Engineers a
group of environmental scientists to counterbalance the bias engineers have
towards development and the belief they tend to have in technical solutions
to environmental problems. This alone, however, might not be sufficient.
Experience with corporate mergers have shown that merely combining
groups with different backgrounds and decisionmaking norms does not en-
sure against misplaced reliance on such norms: One group might dominate
the process and simply ignore the input from the other group;92 alterna-
tively, the group cultures might clash irreconcilably causing stagnation of
the decisionmaking process altogether.93 Thus, along with a call for inclu-
sion of staff members with disparate backgrounds in the decisionmaking
process, one needs to specify meta-rules that will determine how those
members will interact.
94
92. See Gordon A. Walter, Culture Collision in Mergers and Acquisitions, in
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 301, 311-13 (Peter J. Frost et al. eds., 1985) (describing how
one company's culture tends to override that of other for various types of mergers and ac-
quisitions).
93. A unified, "strong" corporate culture helps a corporation to overcome organiza-
tional complexity allowing coordination and control of its employees' behavior, which in
turn allows the corporation to respond quickly and efficiently to its external environment.
See JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKE-r, CORPORATE CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE 141-
42 (1992); DANIEL R. DENISON, CORPORATE CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS 180 (1990). Although a strong culture does not guaranty that the response
to the external environment will improve performance, see KOTTER & HESKETT, supra, the
absence of any organizational culture makes coordinated action extremely difficult. Cf
Meidinger, supra note 82, at 359 (asserting that "[o]nly by working from some base of
shared understandings can any group of people act in concert with each other").
94. How the various group members interact will depend on what tasks they are as-
signed and what authority they, or the office to which they belong, are given over the deci-
sions of the group. If offices that do not share decisionmaking norms retain overlapping
authority over a decision, any conflict about that decision will have to be resolved at a
higher level of authority within the agency. Resolution at a higher level of authority de-
creases the efficiency of decisionmaking but increases the accountability of the agency by
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This too is difficult to do ex ante. The degree to which the structure of
administrative law should empower non-traditional offices in an agency
depends on the propriety of reliance on the agency's traditional decision-
making norms. Again, this will vary with the particularities of the decision
facing the agency. In many cases, the use of norms that have dominated
agency decisionmaking will reflect valuable lessons from the agency's past
experience and should be encouraged, while in other cases unthinking reli-
ance on such norms will result in bad decisions. Thus, the intractability of
determining when reliance on norms is appropriate renders ex ante controls
over agency decisionmaking insufficient.
The inability of ex ante constraints to foresee the myriad of contexts in
which regulators will have to apply rules, along with the abstract nature of
decisionmaking norms, make ex ante constraints on agency discretion, con-
straints that prevent the agency from making policy or deviating from it
once made, unlikely means of balancing the need for constraints against the
need for regulatory flexibility. Review of particular agency decisions after
they are made, what I call ex-post review, thus presents itself as the likely
means for providing such a balance. But, recent recognition of the costs of
ex-post review suggests that first one must determine whether meaningful
review is appropriate at all or alternatively whether agencies should be free
to adopt individual rules or reach particular adjudicatory decisions inde-
pendent of oversight on any level other than political oversight of the
agency's overall performance.
III. THE NEED FOR Ex-POST CONSTRAINTS ON AGENCY DISCRETION
A. Arguments for Relaxing Ex-Post Review ofAgency Decisions
Although ex-post constraints may be needed to promote wise adminis-
trative decisionmaking, unfortunately, such constraints have contributed to
the judicialization of the rulemaking process.95 Since the late 1960s, courts
have relied on active review of agency decisions to balance the tension
between the needs for regulatory flexibility and legal constraint. Courts
have allowed agencies significant substantive and procedural leeway in
making policy to implement their enabling statutes, but have demanded that
agencies demonstrate that they have seriously deliberated about the policy
options facing them. For example, the Supreme Court has held that, in
rulemaking proceedings, courts cannot mandate that an agency use proce-
allowing greater control of policy development by agency heads and ultimately the polity.
See HERBERT A. SIMON ET AL., PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 164-68 (Transaction ed. 199 1).
95. See McGarity, Ossification of Rulemaking, supra note 36, at 528; Pierce, Unin-
tended Effects, supra note 5, at 26.
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dures in addition to the minimal procedures required by the APA or those
specified by the agency's own rules.96 The courts continue to allow agen-
cies to set policy in case-by-case adjudication as well as in policy state-
ments and guidelines not even subject to these minimal notice and com-
ment requirements.97 At the same time, however, courts have required
agencies to open their administrative proceedings to regulatory beneficiar-
ies not directly subject to the rule or order at issue.98 Judges have also
scrutinized the reasons agencies give for their decisions to ensure that the
agencies consider every factor that the court deems relevant to those deci-
sions. 99
In the past decade, both Capitol Hill and the White House have also in-
creased their ex-post scrutiny of agency rulemaking. Agencies must now
prepare economic assessments that identify the costs and benefits of major
96. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). More recently, the Supreme Court held that courts could not rely
on general notions of fairness to require that an agency follow procedures in informal adju-
dication that are not mandated by the authorizing statute or the agency rules, even though
this may relieve the agency from providing any procedure at all in such adjudications. See
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655 (1990).
97. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (affirming agency
policy set in adjudicatory proceeding); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947)
(same); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (rejecting challenge to agency policy statement because agency indicated it would
consider deviations from policy in individual cases). Several administrative law scholars
believe that these holdings leave agencies too much leeway to adopt standards that effec-
tively bind private entities without affording these entities sufficient notice and opportunity
to participate in developing these standards. See Anthony, Interpretive Rules, supra note
41, at 1317-18; Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985
DuKE L.J. 381, 383-84, 402.
98. See National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 735-38 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005
(1966); see also Albert K. Butzel, Intervention and Class Actions before the Agencies and
the Courts, 25 ADMIN. L. REv. 135, 135-37 (1973) (stating that agencies now allow liberal
intervention in formal adjudicatory proceedings); Stewart, Reformation, supra note 25, at
1749 (describing how increased access to agency proceedings was part of general movement
of administrative law towards accommodating interest groups).
99. Even before the inception of the APA, courts evaluated agency decisions based on
the reasons the agency gave for them. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87
(1943). Nonetheless, review of agency policy choices was extremely deferential until the
Supreme Court intimated that courts were to ensure that agencies carefully considered all
factors relevant to the decision, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971), and Judge Leventhal announced the hard look test, see Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), under which courts involve
themselves intimately with the issues raised by a decision in order to assess whether the
agency gave a sufficiently careful look at all such issues. See Seidenfeld, Demystifying, su-
pra note 39, at 491-92 (describing operational demands of hard look test).
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rules1 °° The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews these as-
sessments and can force agencies to negotiate about rules that it finds are
not economically justified.' 0' Congress now reviews all agency rules on a
fast-track basis; Congress has sixty days to disapprove a major legislative
rule by an up-or-down vote before the rule goes into effect.
0 2
According to critics of the current regulatory process, ex-post review has
discouraged flexible regulation. It induces agencies to engage in collection
and analysis of data merely to satisfy its overseers - Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the courts - even when the information generated will not influ-
ence the agency decision.'0 3  Such review encourages agencies to open
their policymaking deliberations to a myriad of interest groups who view
others in the proceeding as adversaries. This adversarial atmosphere in
turn fosters strategic use of the agency proceeding for delay, obfuscation,
or creating a record for a subsequent court challenge. 0 4 The demands of
ex-post review force the agency to devote a vast quantity of resources to
formalities of explanation in order for the agency policy to survive judicial
and OMB review, 10 5 and increases uncertainty about whether the agency
will satisfy such review even after performing the required analyses. 0 6 At
best, critics claim, agencies will attempt to meet the demands of such re-
view, which will greatly slow the adoption of rules; at worst, agencies will
shy away from their regulatory mandates altogether. The result has been
100. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994). President Reagan was the first to impose a cost-benefit requirement on agency
rules, although a OMB review of some rules as a purported means of monitoring regulatory
costs dates back to President Nixon. See Percival, supra note 57, at 133-34.
101. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence of Agency
Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REv. 1, 44-45 (1994) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Big Picture Ap-
proach].
102. The Small Business Regulatory Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801, 804 (Supp.
III 1997). For a thorough description of the fast track review process, see generally Daniel
Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REv.
95 (1997).
103. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. I,
21 (1982); Melnick, supra note 3, at 247; Pierce, Two Problems, supra note 4, at 310.
104. See Harter, supra note 103, at 20-21; Robert B. Reich, Regulation by Confrontation
or Negotiation?, f-ARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1981, at 82, 86-91; Robert A. Kagan, Adver-
sarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369, 375-79
(1991).
105. See Richard J. Pierce, Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminish-
ing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 61, 71 (1997).
106. See id. at 65; Mashaw, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 39, at 203. But cf Patricia
M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution of Most of the Problem?, 67 S.
CAL. L. REv. 621, 636-39 (1994) (concluding that during 1992-93 term, D.C. Circuit re-
manded only six of thirty-six rules because the agency failed to supply adequate reasons,
and noting that, even in these cases, the court frequently reversed only part of rule).
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described as the ossification of the rulemaking process, 107 or alternatively
as paralysis by analysis. 08 The solution, say critics of the process, is to re-
lieve the agency of the need to persuade reviewers of the wisdom of the
agency policy. 0 9 By their accounts, review should depend only on the out-
come the agency reaches, not on the process it used to get to that decision,
and judicial review should not be at all searching.
B. Problems with Relaxing Ex-Post Review
Ex-post review appears to have contributed to slowing agency rulemak-
ing processes and making them costlier than the proponents of the APA
envisioned in 1947.110 But, these affects may be justified in light of a
genuine concern about the power many agencies now wield. It seems ap-
propriate that an agency involve the general public and take care to con-
sider feasible alternatives to a regulatory scheme that will cost hundreds of
millions of dollars and affect the health and welfare of a large segment of
the populace. Even for less significant rules, such review may serve a le-
gitimating function in our democratic system."' Moreover, there are indi-
107. See McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 3, at 1385-86 (attributing term "ossification"
to Don Elliot).
108. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory
State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1523 (1996); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a
Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of
Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733, 757 (1996); Sydney M. Wolf, Fear
and Loathing About the Public Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency
Planning and Public Right-to-Know Act, I 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 317 (1996).
109. See McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 3, at 1453; Pierce, Unintended Effects, supra
note 5, at 29; cf Patricia M. Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135, 138 (1982) (suggesting that courts should actas
judicial "nursemaids" to agency decisionmaking).
110. "The consensus in 1946 was that administrative procedure, rather than judicial re-
view, was the best mechanism for controlling agency discretion." Patricia M. Wald, Judi-
cial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays
On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 223 (1996) [hereinafter Wald, Judicial Review]; see also
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 77-79 (1941) (suggesting that ex-
tensive judicial review would destroy benefits of expertise and specialization provided by
administrative agencies); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1266-68 (1986) (stating that "a strong measure of judicial deference to
agency decisions accurately reflected the tenor of the leading administrative decisions
handed down in the post-New Deal era").
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV.
421, 470-74 (1987) (arguing that "hard look" judicial review constrains agencies from en-
gaging in improperly motivated decisions); id. at 456 (suggesting that OMB review of rule-
making "unites ... [the] seemingly antagonistic aspirations of... technical expertise and
political accountability"); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation ofPowers and the Requirement ofAdequate Reasons for Agency
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cations that ex-post review helps curb documented abuses of the regulatory
system. 12 Hence, before calling for a return to an era of unfettered agency
discretion, one should evaluate the extent to which various aspects of ex-
post review help check abuses and the extent to which these aspects impose
superfluous costs on the regulatory system. I have identified three major
categories into which most of problems caused by relatively unchecked
discretion fall: Domination of agency decisionmaking by special interest
groups, unwarranted political influence on agency decisionmaking, and
agency imposition of idiosyncratic values via its regulatory decisions.
1. The Threat of Interest Group Domination ofAgency Policy
Unfettered agency discretion to implement the purposes of a rule may
lead to domination of agency decisionmaking by special interest groups.
As regulators' discretion increases, so does the potential for special interest
groups to influence agency policy. The concern of interest group domina-
tion is a generalization of the notion of capture that became a major focus
of those who studied economic regulation from the 1950s to the 1970s." 3
But domination is a broader concept than capture; it occurs whenever an
interest group consistently influences an agency to regulate for the benefit
of the group rather than to promote stated statutory aims. 1 4 Although, like
Decisions, 1987 Duke L.J. 387, 428-30, 432 (contending that heightened scrutiny of agency
reasoning preserves both liberal values reflected in Constitution and progressive values
which undergird administrative state).
112. See Sanford E. Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 62 IOWA L. REv. 839, 849-50 (1977) (describing how Eighth Circuit twice re-
versed EPA's wet corn milling effluent standard which was not supported by data in rule-
making record); see also William F. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking,
85 YALE L.J. 38, 56-59 (1975) (describing how hard look doctrine forced EPA lead agencies
to take into account legitimate concerns from those in other EPA offices). But see
McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 3, at 1416-17 (citing corn wet milling rulemaking as
example of judicial over-reaching in reviewing agency decision).
113. See Merrill, supra note 46, at 1050-52 (discussing history and theory of capture and
its influence on administrative law). For a comprehensive discussion of both the general
problem of capture and the mechanisms by which it may come about, see generally PAUL
QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (198 1).
114. The classical understanding of capture defines it as the unique susceptibility of
agencies to domination by the industry which they were intended to regulate. See Merrill,
supra note 46, at 1050-51. My definition of domination requires neither that the influence
come from the regulated industry nor that the agency be the only governmental institution
subject to the dominant interest group's influence. Domination, like the capture, does not
include regulation on behalf of an interest group if the publicly stated purpose of the statute
is to benefit that group. Cf WILSON, supra note 6, at 75-76 (asserting that regulation to
benefit interest groups is not capture if "Congress intended it that way"). I include in my
definition, however, regulation to benefit groups when such benefit may have been a hidden
objective of Congress, although such regulation may reflect capture of the legislature along
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capture, the threat of domination is greatest when an agency regulates a
particular industry, it can occur whenever, within a particular policy area,
the agency perceives itself as serving the interests of a discrete group with
intense interest in the outcome of agency decisions." 15
Those who propose easing judicial review of agency decisions to deos-
sify the rulemaking process would have courts defer to agency decisions of
policy unless the decision was beyond the agency's legal authority or was
essentially irrational." 6  Such a standard would reinstate the traditional
view of the APA, which dominated administrative law from 1947 until the
late 1960s.1 17 Under such a view, political oversight provided the primary
constraint on agency policymaking. Domination scenarios, however, fre-
quently involve situations in which political oversight will exacerbate
rather than eradicate the influence of focused special interests. Special in-
terest groups carry on their political battles on a multitude of fronts." 8 In-
terest groups commonly befriend legislators who are on committees that
oversee an agency's jurisdiction or budget, or who otherwise can influence
agency policy, to pressure the agency to regulate on the groups' behalf.' 9
with that of the agency. In fact, much unjustifiable special interest regulation is the product
of cozy relationships among those who populate a particular policy subsystem, e.g., legisla-
tive staff assigned to the committee or subcommittee overseeing the regulation, administra-
tors responsible for implementing the regulatory program, and interest group representa-
tives. See James A. Thurber, Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in American Politics, in
INTEREST GROUP POLrrlcs 319, 327-30 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 3d ed.
1991) (describing "dominant policy subsystems").
115. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Inter-
est, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 167, 169-70 (Special
Issue 1990).
116. See, e.g., McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 3, at 1453 (calling for pass/fail stan-
dard of review); see also Seidenfeld, Demystifying, supra note 39, at 499-500 (discussing
proposal for more deferential standards of judicial review).
117. Cf Wald, Judicial Review, supra note 110, at 224-25 (noting shift from deferential
to hard look review courts made in 1960s and 1970s).
118. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Envi-
ronmental Mind?, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 463, 505 n. 196 (conjecturing that congressional sub-
committee is as, or more, likely to be captured by special interest group than is an agency).
But cf Jonathan Bendor & Terry M. Moe, Agenda Control, Committee Capture and the Dy-
namics of Institutional Politics, 80 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 1187, 1202 (1986) (predicting that
industry capture of congressional committee may be short-lived or may "promote policy
outcomes that are less desirable than those that could have been obtained by ignoring the
committee entirely").
119. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR 100,
114 (1981) (describing how Senator Byrd's interest in encouraging use of high-sulphur east-
ern coal influenced EPA regulation of sulphur dioxide emissions from coal burning power
plants); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Envi-
ronmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 311, 357 (asserting that
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Hence, reformers who propose reading arbitrary and capricious review as a
minimal rationality standard do little to quell fears of dysfunctional interest
group domination of regulatory policy.
120
Regulatory reformers downplay the significance of interest group domi-
nation. They believe that judicial interference with agencies' efforts to
regulate is a more predominate malady plaguing federal regulatory agen-
cies than is the potential for undue interest group influence, and seek a re-
turn to the era of greater trust in agency processes. 12 1 They seem to have
forgotten, however, the warnings from a previous generation of scholars of
regulation who found capture to be pervasive during the 1950s and
1960s. 122 Studies of agencies as diverse as the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, 2 3 the Federal Maritime Commission, 24 the Federal Communications
Commission, 2  and the Interstate Commerce Commission 26 found evi-
dence of capture. Although these studies may have overestimated the in-
fluence on agency staff of opportunities for jobs in regulated industries, 27
they consistently found that agencies harbored biases in favor of focused
interest groups affected by agency decisions.
congressional oversight of agency action is likely to empower few isolated interest groups
that are able to persuade committee chairs to express their concerns to agency).
120. Tom Merrill hypothesizes that active judicial review stemmed from judge's at-
tempts to constrain agency biases, which capture theory purported to reveal. See Merrill,
supra note 46, at 1065-67. Merrill suggests that current political attitudes distrust all
branches of government, see id. at 1069, which explains the push by political conservatives
for deregulation, but not that of reformers who call for increased agency discretion.
121. See, e.g., McGarity, Ossification of Rulemaking, supra note 36, at 530 (describing
agencies as institutions trying to implement a statutorily sanctioned progressive agenda, and
courts as driven by conservative political agenda); Pierce, Unintended Effects, supra note 5,
at 22-27 (attributing natural gas shortage to effects of judicial review of FERC rules, and
predicting electricity shortage because of nature of such review).
122. For example, Marver Bernstein hypothesized capture as a necessary part of the life-
cycle of independent regulatory agencies. See MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BusINEss
BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 86-90, 155-60 (1955).
123. See, e.g., PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS 141-45 (1949). But see
WILSON, supra note 6, at 73-74 (giving alternative explanation for TVA's seeming preoccu-
pation with building power plants and its ignorance of such statutory goals as regional plan-
ning and agricultural development).
124. See, e.g., Edward Mansfield, Federal Maritime Commission, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 42, 64-68 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
125. See, e.g., ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION
123-24 (1973) (noting that "for most high level FCC [staff members, their agency] job is an
entry into a career in the industry," and asserting that these individuals "must find them-
selves - at least some of the time - in the difficult position of sorting out the public interest
from their own interest as future employees of regulated firms").
126. See, e.g., ROBERT C. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMIssION: THE
PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC 1-39 (1970).
127. See QUIRK, supra note 113, at 164-74.
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Although evidence suggests that traditional capture mechanisms are not
a pervasive problem today,' 28 that does not mean that domination is not a
potential threat or that particular interest groups no longer exert undue in-
fluence on agency decisionmaking. Capture has been kept somewhat in
check by changes in the structure of agencies, in the regulatory processes
by which they make decisions, and by increased public and judicial over-
sight of agency decisions. The composition of agency staffs is less mono-
lithic today than it was thirty years ago. Norms shared by staff members
greatly influence the policies that the staff will promote. Prior to the
statutory requirement that agencies evaluate the environmental impact of
their decisions, 129 and judicial development of the "hard look doctrine,"'' 30
agencies tended to assign total responsibility for administering discrete
regulatory responsibilities to a particular program office within the agency,
whose staff members often shared a common professional background with
employees of the industry being regulated.' 31 Hence, these staff members
were likely to view their role' as facilitating the provision of goods or serv-
ices by the industry, and would not question whether accepted industry
practices were in need of change.132 Today, agencies promulgate regula-
128. See WILSON, supra note 6, at 83-88. While perhaps not pervasive, industry influ-
ence on regulators' incentives still can pressure administrators to make unwise and often
unfortunate regulatory decisions. See WARREN, supra note 7, at 65-66, 193 (suggesting that
industry pressure made FAA decisions to ground DC-l0s following several crashes difficult,
and contributed to NASA's ill fated decision to launch Challenger space shuttle); The FAA
Should Inspect Itself, WASH. POST, May 23, 1996, at A20 (reporting, in aftermath of ValuJet
crash in Everglades, that National Transportation Safety Board had raised questions over the
years about FAA's responses to airlines' pressures on safety issues).
129. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321- 4370d (1994)..
130. See Seidenfeld, Syncopated Chevron, supra note 33, at 128 n.239 (citing cages. in
which D.C. Circuit developed hard look doctrine); Stewart, Reformation, supra note 25, at
1756-60 (detailing development of "the adequate consideration" doctrine for review of
agency decisionmaking).
131. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 57, 60 [hereinafter McGarity, Internal Structure] (as-
serting that prior to development of social regulatory programs, agency experts were "com-
partmentalized," and decisions rarely required application of multitude of types of expertise
that could precipitate clash between offices within agency); Seidenfeld, Demystifying, supra
note 39, at 493-94 (relating structure of agencies' staffs and decisionmaking processes to
requirements of NEPA and development of hard look review). A program office exempli-
fies what Herb Simon has called "unitary organization." See SIMON ET AL., supra note 94, at
268 (defining unitary organization as "the lowest level at which the combined efforts of spe-
cialized persons or groups can be integrated by relating them to a common, socially mean-
ingful goal").
132. See SIMON, supra note 71, at 290-91 (describing how administrator's identification
with office compromises ability to evaluate questions of trade offs between goals of office
and other social goals); see also SIMON ET AL., supra note 94, at 160-61 (describing how
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tions only after the office primarily responsible for them has consulted with
staff members from various other offices. 133  Staff scientists, engineers,
economists, lawyers, and representatives of an office responsible for inter-
acting with beneficiaries of the regulatory scheme all have some internal
influence on proposed agency regulations. Thus, if one office within an
agency, employing individuals predominantly from a single profession to
serve a particular role in the agency, were to push pro-industry regulation,
its position would likely be challenged by another office assigned a differ-
ent role in the process.
In addition, technological advances and an awareness of interest group
politics have fostered access to agency proceedings by representatives of
groups with diffuse interests - the so called public interest groups. Public
interest group, representatives, together with an active and diverse press,
bring pro-industry agency decisions to light.134 Congress today monitors
agency decisions more closely than ever before. 3 5 Public interest groups
retain staff members who monitor and evaluate agency policies and lobby-
ists who bring adverse agency decisions to the attention of legislative
committee staffs or even committee members. 36 These groups also fre-
quently file citizen suits challenging such decisions in court. 137 Thus, today
grouping of functions into office for efficiency can result in expansion of and increased em-
phasis on programs of office).
133. See McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 131, at 73-76 (describing how EPA
utilizes workgroups with members from different offices and with different professional
backgrounds to develop proposed rule).
134. See Quirk, supra note 113, at 84-85.
135. Recently Congress has provided for fast track legislative review of all agency rules.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (Supp. 111 1997); see also Shapiro, Political Oversight, supra note
5,, at 25-26 (describing trend towards increased congressional micromanagement of agency
policy).
136. See KAY L. SCHLozMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 289-310 (1986) (discussing various ways that interest groups inter-
act with legislators and their aids); Diana M. Evans, Lobbying the Committee: Interest
Groups and the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, in INTEREST GROUP
POLITICS, supra note 114,.at 257, 258-70 (using interest group activity with respect to par-
ticular bill to demonstrate various means by which groups lobby Congress); Robert H.
Salisbury, Putting Interests Back into Interest Groups, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra
note 114, at 371, 382 (stating that in addition to lobbying, significant amount of interest
group resources are "devoted to monitoring, tracking and assessing the activities of govern-
ment officials and of other groups in the policy domain").
137. See Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental
Citizen Suits Became an Entitlement Programs, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 107 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith eds., 1992); David R.
Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not
Be a Crowd When Different Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their
Citizens, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1618 (1995).
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rarely are agencies captured in the sense of operating across-the-board with
the single-minded goal of fulfilling the political demands of a particular fo-
cused interest group, precisely because agencies no longer have substantive
discretion to ignore the interests of other groups that regulatory statutes
purport to protect.
Nonetheless, within niches of an agency's policy domain, firms in regu-
lated industries and interest groups with strong central staffs still occupy a
favored position in regulatory and political structures that allows them an
advantage in influencing agency decisions.'38 They have the incentive and
means to monitor what the agency does on a day-to-day basis. They often
have information without which a regulatory agency cannot do its job.3 9 A
regulated entity frequently is a large corporation with resources to appeal
agency decisions at every level. Finally, regulated entities and special in-
terest groups often contribute significantly to political campaigns. 140  For
all of these reasons, administrators have a strong incentive to cooperate
with entities directly subject to their regulatory decisions and other interest
groups that regularly participate in the agency's proceedings. Decreasing
controls over agency discretion could reinvigorate a special interest variant
on capture as a regulatory problem.
Recent concerns about the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
demonstrate the potential for domination when an agency is not subject to
legal constraints on its discretion. Because building new nuclear power
plants is not a competitive option for power companies today,' 4' the NRC's
138. See William P. Browne, Issue Niches and the Limits of Interest Group Influence, in
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 114, at 345, 346-47 (concluding that, to avoid inter-
group competition, agricultural special interest groups today divide policy domains into
niches, with each group having influence over particular niche).
139. According to one scholar of the process by which interest groups wield influence,
"information, knowledge, and analysis are the primary currencies of interest groups in the
policy subsystems." See James A. Thurber, Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in American
Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 114, at 339; see also Arthur Lupia &
Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter & Spring 1994, at 91, 109 (arguing that interest groups preserve value of
their access to legislators by making sure information they provide is "accurate and suc-
cinct").
140. See James A. Thurber, Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in American Politics, in
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 114, at 339 (noting that campaign contributions pro-
vide access to legislators and their staffs that in turn can lead to reciprocal relationships of
trust, and ultimately to interest group influence over such matters as selection of high level
agency personnel); Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 139 (stating that campaign contribu-
tions grant affluent interest groups access to Congress, but do not ensure influence).
141. See Richard Goldsmith, Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nuclear Power, 20
HOFSTRA L. REv. 159, 159 (1991). The last nuclear power plant to come on line in the
United States was that in Seabrook, New Hampshire in 1990. No new nuclear power plants
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current major role is oversight of management and enforcement of regula-
tions at existing plants. 142 Oversight and enforcement are agency activities
especially prone to domination. They both involve exercises of discretion
by field investigators that are not easily second-guessed by those in the
NRC's central office responsible for guiding agency policy. They are also
the regulatory functions subject to the least judicial oversight: Courts have
little opportunity to consider inspection policies and generally do not re-
view agency decisions not to enforce violations. 43 Thus, there is little in-
centive for the NRC to require deliberation by staff members with varied
perspectives. Staff members tend to have a common background in nuclear
engineering and many come from the Navy nuclear program.'" This back-
ground instills in the NRC staff a common confidence in technology's
ability to overcome basic problems. In addition, political oversight is not
likely to prevent interest group domination. Decisions not to enforce often
are based on information to which the agency is privy that is protected from
public disclosure. Moreover, the nuclear power industry contributes heav-
ily to the campaigns of key congressional committee members, who have
stymied efforts to beef-up agency monitoring and enforcement of rule vio-
lations. 45 Not surprisingly, the NRC is perceived as an agency heavily be-
holden to the industry it regulates.
46
have been ordered since before the accident at Three Mile Island, in 1979. See Michael B.
Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAm URB. L.J. 495, 496 n.6 (1992); Goldsmith,
idsupra, at 159.
142. See JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 30-40 (1994) (describing how change in
NRC's role from promoter of rapid development of nuclear power to ensurer of safe opera-
tions at existing plants led agency to change from specifying safety hardware to overseeing
utility management of nuclear plants); Michael Remez & Mike McIntire, Critics Say NRC
and Utilities Have an Unholy Alliance, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 2, 1996, at Al.
143. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985) (holding that agency refusal
to enforce regulation is presumptively unreviewable, and suggesting that review will be
limited to particular situation where Congress indicated that enforcement was mandatory
and regulatory scheme represented only means for vindication of personal statutory inter-
est).
144. See Remez & McIntire, supra note 142.
145. See id. (reporting how Senator Faircloth, chairperson of subcommittee that over-
sees regulation of nuclear industry, blocked appointment to NRC of former subcommittee
staffer who had aggressively investigated power plant operating companies' alleged harass-
ment of safety whistleblowers).
146. The perception of problems with NRC enforcement of safety requirements
prompted the General Accounting Office to issue a report blaming the NRC's lax enforce-
ment for troubles at several nuclear plants. See Michael Remez, NRC Oversight Faulted for
Nuclear Plant Woes, HARTFORD COURANT, June 18, 1997, at Al; Jenny Weil, GAO Report
of NRC Oversight of Nuclear Plants, INSIDE NRC, June 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL
9131911. Recent evidence indicates, however, that the agency enforcement staff may be
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2. The Potential for Unwarranted Political Influence
Discretion may also' foster unwarranted political influence over agency
decisionmaking. Agencies frequently operate in a politically charged arena
and much of what occurs in this arena is hidden from public view. Mid-
level bureaucrats ultimately must account for their day-to-day activity to
political appointees in the agency who may in turn mirror the concerns of
the current administration regarding regulatory policy. Agency staff mem-
bers frequently must also explain their activities to congressional staffers
who continuously monitor agency decisions on behalf of particular mem-
bers of congressional committees that control the agency's substantive
mandate or budget.147 The White House and Capitol Hill have each estab-
lished more formal mechanisms for reviewing the wisdom of agency rules.
Executive agencies must prepare a cost-benefit analysis for every major
rule they propose, and they cannot adopt a rule over OMB's objection
without appealing to the Vice President. 148 Pragmatically, this results in
executive agencies negotiating with OMB about differences in proposed
rules. Under provisions adopted as part of the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act,' 4 Congress now reviews every legislative rule
on a fast-track basis. Such a rule does not go into effect until Congress has
had sixty days to consider whether to pass legislation rescinding the rule on
an up-down vote. 50 Thus, it is not surprising that agency discretion about
regulation can translate into greater influence on policy by individuals in
the political branches of government.'
5
'
breaking out of its historical industry mindset under the current NRC Chairperson. See
Jonathon Rabinovitz, A Push for New Standards in Running Nuclear Plants, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1I, 1998, at Al; see also REES, supra note 142, at 156-57 (concluding that meltdown at
Three Mile Island prompted emergence of "industrial morality" within utilities operating
nuclear power plants).
147. See PETERS, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 79, at 305-06; JOEL D.
ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 79-
104 (1990); cf Morris S. Ogul, Congressional Oversight: Structures and Incentives, in
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 317, 322-25 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds.,
2d ed. 1981) (describing gap between perceptions of need for oversight and actual oversight
by committees, but noting that some of gap can be explained by much oversight being done
informally by committee staff and latently as part of hearings on legislation).
148. See Executive Order No. 12,866, § (8), 3 C.F.R. 638, 648 (1994), reprinted at 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
149. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (Supp. III 1997).
150. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A) (Supp. I11 1997).
151. The political branches may prefer delegation to an agency because without it, the
courts will have a greater say in implementing a regulatory scheme, and the president and
legislators have more ability to constrain legislators than they do judges. See Henry Manne,
Individual Constraints and Incentives in Government Regulation of Business, in THE
INTERACTION OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 23, 28 (Bernard H. Siegan ed., 1977) (stating
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Granting an agency discretion about regulatory policy therefore does not
eliminate the potential for elected officials to influence agency decision-
making. Nor should it. Political influence at some level is imperative to
justify the wide substantive latitude that I have already argued is needed for
a workable administrative state. The politically accountable branches must
be able to ensure that the values underlying an agency's policies do not de-
viate greatly from those generally held by the polity." 2 In addition, legis-
lation may explicitly impose a compromise worked out by a coalition of
interest groups. 53 To the extent that the compromise reflects public debate
about the regulatory issues and a deliberate decision by the full Congress
that compromise may be the best course of action, the agency should not be
free to ignore the legislative deal and pursue the vision of only a subset of
the coalition. Otherwise, the United States could not call itself a democ-
racy. But, in some instances, political influences on agency decisions are
inappropriate and lead to illegitimate or plainly unwise decisions.
The threat of improper political influence is greatest in the context of
particular agency adjudications, which often are resolved outside of the
public limelight. Recognizing that much policy is set via adjudicatory de-
cisions and that fact-finding can affect the implementation of policy, the
APA allows agency heads to reverse the facts found as well as the ultimate
decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) who presides over a formal
adjudication, as long as the record supports the agency's determination.
154
But, without meaningful review of fact-finding and inquiry into the con-
sistency of application of policy in adjudications, the broad discretion given
agencies to decide particular cases invites efforts to induce agencies to rely
on illegitimate political factors, such as the identity or political leanings of
regulated entities.
that "one reason legislators like bureaucratic regulation of private activities so much is be-
cause they have considerable power to stop or reverse a particular line of regulation if it be-
comes beneficial to them to do so").
152. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 700 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) (asserting that only generally accountable legislature "has the toughness
and resiliency to hammer out solutions [to major policy dilemmas] which will command
acceptance").
153. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 540-41
(1983).
154. Some courts have read into the requirement that agency decisions be supported by
substantial evidence, a restriction on agencies overruling determinations that hinge on credi-
bility of witnesses whom the ALI actually heard and the agency did not. See Penasquitos
Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493 (defining substantial evidence standard of review in
APA as requiring agency to consider ALJ decision as part of whole record in proceeding).
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An example of such improper political influence appears to have oc-
curred in FCC television licensing decisions during the Eisenhower ad-
ministration. Many have criticized the FCC's comparative licensing proc-
ess as unprincipled.' 55 The FCC relies on a host of factors without
indicating the importance of each; 5 6 it seemingly can use these factors to
justify awarding the license to any of the competing applicants that meet
the FCC's minimum qualifications. In light of the FCC's breadth of dis-
cretion, it is at least suspicious that, during Eisenhower's presidency, no
newspaper with Democratice leanings and no major newspaper that had
supported Eisenhower's opponent for President, Adlai Stevenson, was
awarded a license in such a proceeding.
5 7
Improper political influence can also enter an adjudicatory decision
when an agency relies on means other than announcement of a new policy
to alter the outcome of particular adjudications. In response to political
pressure, an agency may couch a change of policy as a modification of
factual presumptions or burdens of proof to alter outcomes, or it may try to
influence its lower level decisionmakers by managerial techniques such as
evaluating performance based on outcomes in agency adjudications. Such
backhanded methods of influencing particular adjudications decrease the
ability of the full Congress to evaluate whether the agency's policy has po-
litical support, and the courts to discern whether the policy comes within
the agency's statutory authority. 8
155. See Robert A. Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative
Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1, 39 (1971); Henry Geller, The Com-
parative Renewal Process in Television: Problems and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. REV.
471, 500 (1975); Bernard Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47
GEO. L.J. 655, 678-79 (1959).
156. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C.2d 393, 394-
400 (1965).
157. See William B. Ray, FCC: The Ups and Downs of Radio-TV Regulation 45 (1990);
Bernard Schwartz, The Professor and the Commissions 162-64 (1959).
158. For example, the difficulty for political and judicial monitoring of a surreptitiously
implemented agency policy has prompted criticism of the NLRB's creative use of factual
presumptions essentially to conclude that a majority of striker replacements would support a
striking union, despite the obvious risk to their jobs if the union prevails. See NLRB v.
Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 817 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because
of the means the NLRB chose to implement what is essentially a policy choice, courts will
often dispose of particular appeals to cases under that policy "without ever knowing the sub-
stance of the actual policy." Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball":
NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REv. 387, 413-15
(1995). The NLRB use of factual presumptions and closing its eyes to factual reality about
the views of striker replacements also shields the NLRB's factual predicates for the policy
from review, id at 417, and allows the agency policy to escape the scrutiny of a potentially
hostile Congress. Id. at 412.
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The Reagan administration's attempts to limit Social Security disability
payments exemplifies the potential for such indirect methods of changing
policy to allow improper political influence over agency decisions. In
1980, the Social Security Administration (SSA) adopted the Bellmon Re-
view program, a screening process targeting particular ALJs' decisions for
review based in part on the percentage of cases in which an ALJ awarded
benefits to claimants.'" The SSA thereby encouraged ALJs to deny more
.... 160
claimants disability benefits. By failing to announce any explicit change
in Social Security disability policy, the administration denied Congress and
the courts any concrete rule or statement of policy to evaluate to ensure its
consistency with political constraints and legal prescriptions., 61  The only
159. The SSA program responded to an explicit call by Congress for an ALJ review
program to improve the productivity and consistency of ALJ determinations in disability
cases. See Social Security Disabilities (Bellmon) Amendment of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265,
94 Stat. 441, 456 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1994)). But, the nature of the
review provisions, which were triggered by an ALJ's extraordinary rate of allowing claims,
but not by an ALJ's unusual rate of denying claims, see Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324,
1327 (9th Cir. 1987) (reporting that SSA targeted ALJs who allowed benefits in greater than
66.67% of their cases), suggest an intent on the part of the Reagan administration to cut
back on the number of disability claims allowed. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp.
1315, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that Congress explicitly removed language calling for
ALJ review based on claim allowance rates that had been included in original bill by Sena-
tor Bellmon); Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A
Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council,
17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 199, 241 n.229, 247 (1990) (suggesting that ALJs and members of
SSA Appeals Council perceived pressure to deny more claims under Reagan administration
than under previous administrations); F. William Hessmer IV, Note, Own Motion Review of
Disability Benefit Awards by the Social Security Administration Appeals Council: The Im-
proper Use of an Important Procedure, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 141, 155-56 (1988) (noting that some
viewed Bellmon review as unmistakable attempt to pressure ALJ's to err on side of denial
of benefits).
160. See Koch & Koplow, supra note 159, at 246-47 (stating that ALJs interpreted tar-
geted review under Bellmon Amendment as attempt to pressure them into denying more
claims).
161. The debate over the SSA program focused primarily on the independence of
agency fact-finders under the APA. See. e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administra-
tive Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for ALIs, 7
ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 589, 595-61 (1993). Even commentators who focused on the need for
the SSA to maintain control over the policy implemented by ALJs, however, admitted that
the lack of the agency's use of rulemaking either to change the substantive criteria for dis-
ability benefits or to authorize the review program impeded communication and political
evaluation of the agency's policy. See Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tri-
bunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 965, 1019
(1991) (suggesting that rulemaking would have been more effective way for SSA to com-
municate its policy concerning distinguishing valid from invalid disability claims to ALJs);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmak-
ing: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 481, 515 (1990) [hereinafter
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effective means to ensure that the SSA policy did not prompt ALJs to deny
benefits to statutorily deserving claimants was for the courts to scrutinize
AU fact-finding in virtually thousands of disability petitions for review.
62
Politics can have an undue influence even outside of particular adjudica-
tions. When behind-the-scenes politics influences agency policy in a man-
ner at odds with the public explanations for the agency decision, such in-
fluences do not represent democratic government. 63 This is especially true
when political influence is exercised by particular legislators rather than the
legislative body as a whole,' 64 and when the influence appears to be moti-
vated by the desire to appease special interest groups. Thus, secret deals
between interest group lobbyists, particular legislators, and agency deci-
sionmakers seem not to qualify as legitimate means of political influence.
A salient example of such suspicious behind-the-scenes political influence
occured when Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd pressured the EPA to
set new source performance standards for coal fired plants in a manner that
protected the interests of eastern coal producers.
65
Pierce, Political Control] (stating that "notice and comment rulemaking [to implement the
Bellmon program] would have provided a higher degree of confidence that the SSA's deci-
sion to lower mean reversal [i.e., claim allowance] rates was consistent with Congress's
views on this important policy issue"); Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1332-33 (giving reasons
to believe that SSA intentionally tried to shield Bellmon review from public and congres-
sional oversight).
162. See Koch & Koplow, supra note 159, at 227 (reporting that courts handle 10,000
petitions for review of social security claims each year). The rate of judicial reversal of
SSA disability cases rose from 20% to 57% following the SSA institution of non-
acquiescence to judicial statutory interpretation and the AU review program. See Pierce,
Political Control, supra note 161, at 518. This would seem to indicate that the politically
motivated move to decrease the number of social security claims did lead the agency to
contradict the courts' reading of the statute in awarding disability benefits.' But see id. (at-
tributing increase in reversal rate to anger of judges in reaction to Reagan administrations
use of Bellmon review, increased use of non-acquiescence and policy of reopening cases of
individuals receiving disability benefits).
163. This is the basis for one scholar advocating that courts use legislative history in
which proponent's of legislation make public pronouncements regarding statutory purposes
as a tool for interpreting statutes. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COL. L. REv.
223, 262 (1986).
164. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 365-66 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (reversing and remanding rule which agency sought to justify as response to
comments by eleven members of Congress).
165. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 119, at 114 (reporting this political deal
unfavorably). But see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 410 (affirming resulting EPA
rule on sulphur dioxide emissions from coal fired power plants because petitioner could
demonstrate neither that Senator Byrd had sought to force EPA to consider factors other
than those Congress made statutorily relevant nor that EPA had considered such extraneous
factors).
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For some critics of politics as it is currently practiced, pure interest
group politics is suspect even if it takes place in the sunshine. 66  Such
politics is biased. Groups with power and money have an advantage in the
political free-for-all between interest groups for political benefits.' 67 Enti-
ties can influence politicians by contributing their money to PACs and by
using their power to deliver votes for particular candidates. 168 Moreover,
those with money and power tend to share interests with a small number of
others and have a lot to gain or lose from political battles. In other words,
the rich and powerful often have focused interests, and therefore face fewer
free-rider problems and lower cost of organizing to lobby political deci-
sionmakers. 169 Thus, the system tends to deliver benefits to these focused
interest groups to the detriment of the remainder of society.
166. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-47
(1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival] (disussing differing theories of political
participation); Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note 48, at 1533 (discussing problems
with pluralistic democracy).
167. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note 48, at 1535.
168. Some studies show a substantial impact of special interest campaign spending on
legislation. See, e.g., James B. Kau et al., A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional
Voting, 97 Q.J. ECON. 271, 274-75 (1982) (finding significant impact of business campaign
contributions on some regulatory legislation); Allen Wilhite & John Theilmann, Labor PAC
Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach, 53 PUB. CHOICE 267,
274 (1987) (finding that labor PAC contributions influenced legislators' votes). Other
studies, however, show little influence of campaign spending. See, e.g., Janet M. Grenzke,
PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency Is Complex, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1,
19-20 (1989) (finding that PAC contributions generally do not affect voting patterns by
members of House, but noting that powerful interest groups can mobilize electoral support,
which influences legislators' voting); John R. Wright, PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls:
An Organizational Perspective, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 400, 412 (1985) (concluding that
"campaign contributions of PACs appear to take (sic) substantial effect [on roll call votes in
the House] only infrequently"). Most likely, the influence of campaign contributions varies
with the circumstances surrounding consideration of particular legislation. See Diana M.
Evans, PAC Contributions and Roll-Call Voting: Conditional Power, in INTEREST GROUP
POLITICS 114, 115 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 2d ed. 1986.) (stating that "the
impact of PAC contributions differs from bill to another"); Jean Reith Schroedel, Campaign
Contributions and Legislative Outcomes, 39 WEST. POL. Q. 371, 386-87 (1986) (finding that
campaign contributions influence House members' voting on committees, but only for deci-
sions that occur outside public limelight). What is clear is that, to a significant extent,
money influences elections, see HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY,
ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 20-25 (3d ed. 1984), from which it follows that candi-
dates cannot ignore PACs' abilities to target campaign spending.
169. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 48 (1965); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regula-
tion, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211,213 (1976).
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In addition, interest group politics cannot transcend a notion of the pub-
lic good that merely aggregates the preferences of individuals.'70 Such
politics can do no better than to allocate benefits among various competing
groups. In many instances, government regulation allows special interest
group members to garner monopoly rents.17 1 Political dealmaking in these
instances will actually reduce overall social welfare. It can never transcend
what is at best a zero sum game by, for instance, fostering understanding
and empathy for the plight of others, or using the political process to alter
individuals' values and thereby achieve a more acceptable vision of the
common good.
17 2
These critics of interest group politics look skeptically on political influ-
ence that benefits powerful special interest groups. The FCC give-away of
spectrum to existing television licensees for the development of high-
definition television fits nicely into this category of regulatory action dic-
tated by special interest group politics to the detriment of the public inter-
est. Although auctioning the spectrum would have raised as much as sev-
enty billion dollars, 73 the FCC loaned the spectrum to existing television
licensees until the year 2006 to allow them to broadcast traditional and
digital high definition signals simultaneously. 7 4 In 1990, the FCC had rea-
soned that the simulcast approach would encourage the development of
truly high definition television while enabling the continued reception of
170. See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 166, at 1542; see also Richard A. Ep-
stein, Modern Republicanism - Or the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1639
(1988) (describing political pluralism as accepting "that there is no collective way to define
what constitutes the good life").
171. Monopoly rents in the political context refer to super-normal profits that firms in
the economic market can earn because the government has used its power to make and en-
force law to restrict participation in, or otherwise bias the workings of, those markets. See
James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 8-11 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 21 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Scl. 3, 3 (1971).
172. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note 48, at 1533-34.
173. See Paul Farhi, Their Reception's Great, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1997, at HI [here-
inafter Farhi, Reception's Great].
174. See In the Matter of Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on Existing
Television Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,850 (1997)
[hereinafter Fifth Report and Order]; see also Paul Farhi, FCC to Approve Plan for Digital
Television, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1997, at El [hereinafter Farhi, Digital Television]; JOEL
BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: THE BATTLE FOR THE FuTuRE OF TELEVISION 202 (1997).
Congress and the President have now endorsed this loan: The Telecommunications Act of
1997 limits the eligibility for licenses for "advanced television services" to "persons that...
are licensed to operate a television broadcast station." See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1) (Supp. II
1996).
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free television by those who did not buy high definition television sets. 175
By 1992, the FCC had committed the nation to digital high definition tele-
vision by providing free spectrum to existing television broadcasting licen-
sees. 176 Under political pressure from Congress and the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters, the FCC mandated only that a portion of the spectrum
given to television stations be devoted to high definition TV, and allowed
stations to devote the additional spectrum to other highly remunerative uses
if the station so desired. 177 Moreover, the FCC did not explain why an
auction would not allocate the spectrum to those best able to use it for high
definition television. The FCC also declined to impose any public service
obligation on the recipients of the additional spectrum.
78
The FCC's rationale for the spectrum give-away appears weak, but the
political pressure the National Association of Broadcasters brought to bear
on the FCC was substantial. 179 Current licensees have used their broad-
casting capability to run advertisements promoting granting free second
channels.180 Television licensees, as a group, also donated large sums of
money to PACs during the most recent congressional races.' 8 ' Moreover,
television stations gained influence from their mere ability to control how
much exposure a politician got on the six o'clock news.'8 2 Although the
pressure put on the FCC by individual members of Congress and by the
175. In the Matter of Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on Existing Tele-
vision Broadcast Service, First Report and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 5627, 5628 (1990). The alter-
native, which the FCC had originally considered, would have required high definition sys-
tems to allow for normal quality reception on existing televisions. This would have allowed
at most enhanced analog systems, rather than digital systems supposedly capable of much
better resolution. See BRINKLEY, supra note 174, at 116.
176. See In the Matter of Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on Existing
Television Broadcast Service, Second Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, 3340 n.1, 3344;
BRINKLEY, supra note 174, at 202.
177. See Farhi, Digital Television, supra note 174. The FCC did maintain a partial si-
mulcast requirement beginning in April of 2003, and a full simulcast requirement beginning
in April, 2005, and continuing until the licensees had to return the "borrowed" spectrum in
2006. See Fifih Report and Order, supra note 174, at 12,832.
178. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 174, at 12,829-30. The FCC, however, did
not foreclose the possibility that it would impose additional public service requirements on
providers of HDTV in the future. Id.
179. See Farhi, Reception's Great, supra note 173.
180. See Farhi, Reception's Great, supra note 173.
181. See Farhi, Reception's Great, supra note 173.
182. See Farhi, Reception's Great, supra note 173 (quoting Adam Thierer, economic
policy fellow at Heritage Foundation).
1999]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
President is unclear, the lack of willingness of Congress and the President
to take on the established television media was transparent.1
83
3. The Problem of Idiosyncratic Agency Values
Agency discretion may permit regulation that promotes administrators'
idiosyncratic values. By idiosyncratic values, I mean values that the regu-
lator promotes that are inconsistent with those held generally by the polity.
In most cases, one cannot easily define, let alone determine, values held by
such an amorphous entity as the polity' But, at times, an agency decision
can be identified as clearly at odds with identifiable political leanings of the
electorate manifested in consistent election of legislators who make an is-
sue of a particular regulatory value, as well as. in press reports of public
concern about that value.
Idiosyncratic agency values can be consistent with either a rational actor
model of agency decisionmaking, which posits that agency heads and staff
members rationally seek to maximize their personal well being, or an in-
stitutional model of agency decisionmakers, which assumes that agency
personnel follow norms dictated by their professional and personal envi-
ronments. 84 Under rational actor models, idiosyncratic decisions result
from agency staff and decisionmakers not bearing the direct cost of the de-
cisions they make. This leads to a deviation between the costs a regulatory
scheme imposes on society and the costs it imposes on agency decision-
makers, which in turn leads agency staff to seek outcomes that are not in
the best interests of society. 85 Under institutional models, the staff and
agency head may have internalized different norms from those shared by
the general public, stemming from their professional training, 86 or the role
they play within the agency. 
81
183. See Farhi, Reception's Great, supra note 173 (noting that Newt Gingrich supported
idea of auctioning the spectrum for high definition television, but quoting Speaker of the
House asserting that "[tihe practical fact is, nobody's going to take on the broadcasters").
184. For a discussion of the distinction between rational actor and institutional models
of organizational decisionmaking, see James G. March, Understanding How Decisions
Happen in Organizations, in ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 4, 10-20 (Zur Shapira ed.,
1997).
185. See Diver, supra note 21, at 101-05. For examples of several different economic
models of administrative behavior, see, for example, WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR.,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36-42 (1971) (positing that regulators
seek to maximize their wealth, power, and fame); Peltzman, supra note 169, at 214 (1976)
(assuming that regulators are legislators seeking to maximize votes); Manne, supra note
151, at 29-30 (postulating several interests that politically appointed bureaucrats and career
staff at agencies might pursue).
186. See WILSON, supra note 6, at 59-65 (discussing how and why professional norms
affect bureaucrats' behavior); CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY: A
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Agencies can pursue idiosyncratic values because the political appoint-
ees at the head of the agency have an agenda for the agency that deviates
from that envisioned by public. Especially for executive branch agencies,
this deviation of agendas can occur because, on matters with which the
agency deals, the President has a different set of values than that which
predominates in the legislature or the public at large. For example, Ronald
Reagan was elected on a platform of reducing the burdens of government
regulation, but by all accounts the polity did not intend to give Reagan a
mandate to dismantle environmental protections.' 88 Thus, when Reagan's
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), led by Anne Gorsuch Burford,
undermined enforcement of environmental laws by granting industrial
polluters sweetheart settlements and assuring others that they need not
worry about violations of water pollution regulations, 89 the EPA acted
contrary to strongly expressed values of the electorate.'90
Agency heads can also pursue idiosyncratic values if they manage to get
appointed without fully revealing their agendas, or if the values of the pol-
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION POLEMIC 131-32 (2d ed. 1985) (noting administrators' propensity
to follow professional norms); Charles Pruitt, People Doing What They Do Best: The Pro-
fessional Engineers at NHTSA, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 363, 365-66 (1979) (noting how engi-
neer's backgrounds at NHTSA resulted in their independence from both auto industry and
factors such as consumer acceptance and cost); Frederick C. Mosher, Professions in Public
Service, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 144, 148 (1978) (noting that specialized educational training
and service within particular professional office contribute to unique socialization of public
servants from particular profession).
187. See SAMUEL KRISLOV & DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY
AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 119-20 (1981) (noting that bureaucrats are often so-
cialized to take on viewpoint of clientele they serve in their official capacities); WILSON,
supra note 6, at 36-49 (demonstrating how immediate tasks facing officials affect their atti-
tudes and behavior); Meidinger, supra note 82, at 373-74 (observing that socialization
within agency may be more important than professional background in determining how
regulator will act in particular context).
188. See GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM?: REAGAN'S
REGULATORY DILEMMA 255 (1984); Philip Shabecoff, Ruckelshaus Says Administration
Misread Mandate on Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1983, at Al; Percival, supra note
57, at 191.
189. See PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF
PRIVATE POLLUTION 318-19 (1991); Richard N. L. Andrews, Deregulation: The Failure at
EPA, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 60, at 161, 171; Ronald L. Claveloux, Note,
The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Con-
troversy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1340-44 & n.59.
190. According to President Carter's EPA Administrator Douglas Costle, Burford's ac-
tions at the EPA went clearly beyond the boundary allowed by political consensus concern-
ing the need for environmental protection. HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 59, at 262 (report-
ing personal interview with Costle); see also Robert Cameron Mitchell, Public Opinion and
Environmental Politics in the 1970s and 1980s, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 60,
at 51, 61.
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ity, as expressed through the legislative electoral process, change. Thus, in
the late 1970s, Michael Pertschuk inherited a Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) that actively pursued a consumer protection agenda. He took that
agenda to the point of an anti-industry crusade that deviated from what the
public and ultimately Congress thought appropriate.' 9' Some commenta-
tors attributed this idiosyncratic agenda, in good part, to Pertschuk's radi-
calism regarding consumer issues. 192 Commentators, however, also have
recognized that the backlash to such an active FTC agenda also reflected a
change in the attitudes of the public and key members of Congress towards
protectionist regulation. 193 On this score, Pertschuk stands guilty of simply
failing to stay attuned to the direction of strong political winds. Under ei-
ther scenario, however, the fact remains that by 1979, the FTC agenda was
at odds with what the public and the political process would tolerate.
An agency can engage in idiosyncratic regulation even if the political
appointees who head the agency do not have an agenda at odds with pre-
dominate public values when the agency staff has internalized values not
shared by the public as a whole. Utility maximizing staff members may
seek to set unambitious goals to maximize their leisure and hedge against
unforeseen future demands on their time. 194 Alternatively they may seek to
maximize their power vis-i-vis other offices within the agency or industry
representatives and legislative staff who work within the same regulatory
issue subsystem. 95 Staff members who never think about maximizing their
utility may nonetheless share a unique educational background that has in-
culcated in them norms of a particular profession.' 96 Additionally, their
perceived regulatory role may induce them to see the problems the agency
faces from a perspective that others do not share and this too can dictate the
191. See HARRis& MILKIS, supra note 59, at 183-85.
192. See HARRIs & MILKIS, supra note 59, at 177; Ernest Gellhorn, The Wages of Zeal-
otry: The FTC Under Siege, REGULATION (Jan./Feb. 1980), at 33, 37-40.
193. See HARRIs & MILKIS, supra note 59, at 185-86; Gellhorn, supra note 192, at 40.
One analysis concludes that the FTC agenda was always more radical than that supported by
most of Congress, and was instead consistent with the agendas of key members of the sub-
committees that oversaw the agency. A change in the membership of those subcommittees
resulted in loss of support for this radical agenda. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran,
The Myth of Runaway Bureaucracy: The Case of the FTC, REGULATION (May/June 1982)
33; HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 59, at 191.
194. See MARCH, supra note 10, at 29 (describing how organizations build "slack" into
their search for rational solutions).
195. See SIMON ET AL., supra note 94, at 297-98 (discussing interest of "unitary organi-
zation" (e.g., program offices) within an agency to engage in "empire building").
196. See WILSON, supra note 6, at 60 (defining professional as individual with
"reference group whose membership is limited to people who have undergone specialized
formal education and have accepted a group-defined code of proper conduct").
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use of an idiosyncratic norm for resolving the problem.' 97 Frequently in-
ternal checks on bureaucratic decisionmaking, such as oversight by politi-
cal appointees at the top of the agency, will suffice to prevent the agency
from imposing a regulatory scheme at odds with predominate public val-
ues. Sometimes, however, despite these checks, staff norms can drive idio-
syncratic regulatory decisions.'"
The size of an agency's docket and the need for it to resolve many par-
ticular regulatory matters requires political appointees who head agency
departments to sub-delegate most aspects of adjudicatory or enforcement
decisions and even many rulemaking or policy setting decisions to career
staff not subject to direct political influence. These political appointees
usually do not have the time or resources to monitor all but the most salient
decisions to assure that they are consistent with the agency head's policy
vision.199 Moreover, even when political appointees make the ultimate de-
cision on a matter, they must rely on information and analyses supplied by
staff.2 00 Without a detailed independent evaluation of the staff's position,
197. See Susan J. Miller et al., Decision-Making in Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES 293, 296 (Stewart R. Clegg et al. eds., 1996) (stating that "the
reality of organizations appears to be that once organizational groups are given different
tasks they also begin to formulate their own sets of norms and goals"); Sally Coleman Sel-
den et al., Bureaucracy as a Representative Institution: Toward a Reconciliation of Bureau-
cratic Government and Democratic Theory, 42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 717, 720 (1998) (noting
that "it is the [administrator's] received role that is 'the immediate influence on... behavior
and the immediate source of. . . motivation to role performance."' (quoting ROBERT L.
KAHN ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL STRESS: STUDIES IN ROLE CONFLICT AND AMBIGUITY 16
(1964))); see also SIMON, supra note 71, at 287-90 (administrators who identify with goals
of office in which they work tend to measure decisions in terms of adequacy for office's
goals rather than in broader terms). Essentially, a staff office is a community of experts and
as such its members solve problems using the office's rules, which fit into prevailing para-
digms. The tendency of individuals to adhere to prevailing paradigms is a powerful deter-
rent to discovery of other approaches to solving problems that might prove more fruitful.
See THOMAS S. KUHN, 2 THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 64 (2d ed. 1970); see
also ROURKE, supra note 79, at 32 (asserting that bureaucratic routines manifest great iner-
tia).
198. See Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy Model for Representation of Low-Income In-
tervenors in State Public Utility Proceedings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 672 & n.168 (1990)
(reporting that in formal proceedings before state utility regulatory commissions, commis-
sioners treated views of agency staff as more important than those of outside participants
and even some other commissioners).
199. See WARREN, supra note 7, at 270.
200. See PETERS, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 86, at 225-26; ROURKE supra note 79, at
20-22; cf SIMON, supra note 71, at 225-27 (noting that increased ability to discover and
transmit information requires improved systems for processing and analyzing this informa-
tion, and that for such functions "the most numerous and crucial elements will continue to
be people"). Agency staff members act as a filter for the information that reaches the ulti-
mate decisionmaker in the agency; they limit the information that the decisionmaker must
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the ultimate decisionmaker cannot easily detect subtle but pervasive biases
in the staff provided information, analyses and advice, even when such bi-
ases push the decision consistently toward one end or the other of the po-
litical spectrum. Thus, staff's idiosyncratic perspectives on regulatory is-
sues affect almost every agency decision to some degree, and in some
instances have led to decisions that fail to accord with strongly held values
of the polity.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) re-
quirement that car manufacturers disable an automobile's ignition unless
the occupants of the car had buckled their seatbelt is an example of staff
driven idiosyncratic regulation. Congress had given NHTSA authority and
a mandate to impose technology based regulation to make automobiles
safer and, as part of this mandate, NHTSA adopted the ignition interlock as
a backup to a requirement that auto manufacturers install passive restraint
systems.20 1 When the courts invalidated the passive restraint require-
200
ment, °2 the unpopular interlock was left as the only means for auto manu-
facturers to meet the NHTSA safety standard.20 3 The public outcry to Con-
gress was quick and substantial, and Congress reacted by overturning the
interlock requirement and mandating that NHTSA not impose such a re-
quirement in the future without explicit legislative authorization. 20 4 The
scientifically oriented NHTSA staff had failed to factor into its evaluation
of the interlock the political ramifications of American culture's view of
the automobile as a provider of freedom and excitement. 20 5
Overall, agency discretion cannot be checked adequately by ex ante con-
straints. Such constraints are insufficiently flexible, and cannot alleviate
problems that stem from unconscious use of decisionmaking norms. Yet
constraint is needed to check interest group domination, political influence,
and idiosyncratic agency perspectives that often lead to poor regulatory
policy. That constraint must be ex-post review. The question that remains
to be answered is how to structure ex-post review to induce agency deci-
consider, analyze it and explain its significance. This allows the decisionmaker to focus on
pertinent information and to ignore information that the agency deems irrelevant to the deci-
sion, but also gives the staff great influence over the way the decisionmaker perceives the
issues. See Seidenfeld, Demystifying, supra note 39, at 506; Wallace S. Sayre, Dilemmas
and Prospects of the Federal Government Service, in THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
1, 2 (Wallace S. Sayre ed., 2d ed. 1965).
201. See MASHAW& HARFST, supra note 1, at 133.
202. Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 675-78 (6th Cir. 1972) (re-
versing and remanding NHTSA's original passive restraint rule for failing to specify test
dummy criteria sufficiently objectively).
203. See MASHAW& HAUFST, supra note I, at 134-38.
204. 1974 Amendments to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicles Safety Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-492 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1410b (1994)), repealed by 108 Stat. 745, 1379.
205. See MASHAW, supra note 7, at 66-67.
[51:2
AGENCY DISCRETION
sionmaking that minimizes the triple threat of interest group domination,
improper political influence, and idiosyncratic agency biases.
IV. LESSONS FOR REFORM OF Ex-POST REVIEW
The problems that can stem from agency exercises of discretion freed
from ex-post constraints provide a framework for evaluating the structure
of ex-post review. Reformers who propose methods to "deossify" the ad-
ministrative rulemaking process focus on the burden review imposes on the
agency. They seek to reduce the particular requirements that the decision-
making process must satisfy. One can do so by restricting review to con-
sideration of the outcomes of agency decisions without any regard to the
process or reasoning that the agency uses to reach them.206 Alternatively,
one can attempt to structure review to reinforce decisionmaking processes
that minimize the potential for interest group domination, undue political
influence and idiosyncratic regulation.
A. Structuring Outcome Review
Outcome review minimizes the burdens of the regulatory process on
agencies but is unlikely to avoid problems caused by broad grants of dis-
cretion to agencies to set policy and decide how to apply it in particular
contexts. Much as the competitive market induces efficient production by
leaving manufacturers free to produce as they see fit but sending signals to
consumers and other producers via prices,20 7 outcome review signals the
agency about whether its regulation is good while letting agencies decide
how best to regulate. Thus, reformers have proposed what pragmatically
would be some sort of outcome review by the judiciary, 20 8 Congress, 20 9 or
206. 1 use outcome review to refer to any review that merely compares the final agency
decision to some standard of acceptability, whether it be legal, factual or political. I use
process review to refer to any oversight that evaluates the path the agency took in reaching
its decision. Cf Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Expla-
nation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 313, 317-18 (distinguishing outcome
review from procedural and process review).
207. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY/APPLICATIONS 10 (8th ed.
1994).
208. See, e.g., McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 3, at 1453 (calling for pass-fail stan-
dard of judicial review that would depend primarily on determination of whether agency
rule was, on the whole, rational response to problem confronting agency).
209. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Comment: Rulemaking Ossification - A Modest Pro-
posal, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 453, 457-58 (proposing fast track review of major rules on up-
down basis by Congress); see also notes 102-09 supra and accompanying text (discussing
fast track congressional review recently authorized by statute).
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the President.210 Unfortunately, in the realm of traditional governmental
regulation, there is no competitive market to discipline decisionmaking.
Although outcome review by the political branches provides a necessary
component of meaningful ex-post review, outcome review by itself cannot
curb problems stemming from the three pathologies of agency decision-
making.
Courts are particularly ill-suited for reviewing agency decisions by
evaluating whether they are substantively good enough. As already noted,
the complexity of regulatory environments renders comprehensive ex ante
specification of criteria for assessing the substantive wisdom of rules im-
possible. Thus, an evaluation of the "goodness" of an outcome of regula-
tory decisionmaking necessarily leaves the definition of the evaluative cri-
teria to the reviewing body.21' Even within a particular factual context, the
definition of such criteria are not matters on which everyone would agree.
In essence, substantive outcome review is, at least in part, inherently politi-
cal. It depends on the ability of the agency to convince the public that the
decision is good, or at least that attempting to improve on it would not be a
worthwhile endeavor. One need not be eagle-eyed to observe that the judi-
ciary is not the appropriate institution to impose such value laden con-
straints.
One might counter that, despite the seemingly manifest nature of this ob-
servation, courts have effectively engaged in some degree of substantive
outcome review both with respect to constitutional challenges to govern-
mental action, and under the APA's prohibition of arbitrary and capricious
agency action. But neither body of judicial experience provides an ade-
quate yardstick for courts to measure whether a regulation is sufficiently
justified, a measure they would have to make under judicial outcome re-
view. In the constitutional context, courts evaluate governmental decisions
meaningfully only if those decisions implicate fundamental rights, which
ordinary majoritarian politics cannot be trusted to protect. 212 In constitu-
210. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REv. 469, 507-08 (1985) [hereinafter Pierce, Constitutional
and Political Theory].
211. See Seidenfeld, Big Picture Approach, supra note 101, at 9.
212. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 780 (2d ed. 1988) (pos-
iting that institutional role of political branches and courts is dimension that affects
determination of what rights are judicially protected); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 102-03 (1980) (arguing that heightened judicial scrutiny of governmental deci-
sions should apply to reinforce inclusiveness of political representation); Michael J. Klar-
man, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 747, 750-68
(1991) (demonstrating that judicial rights decisions between 1937 and 1971 comport with
political process theory of judicial review, but decisions after 1971 may have recognized
rights beyond those justifiable under political process based theory).
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tional challenges to socioeconomic legislation, legislation that involves the
kinds of trade-offs which agencies evaluate in the normal course of regula-
tion, courts have asked only whether there is a possible rational connection
between the problem to be solved and the governmental decision. 213 In the
administrative law context, courts applying the hard look test have incorpo-
rated outcome review only to the extent that they ask whether a decision is
patently unjustified in light of the administrative record.214 Such a permis-
sive standard for agency decisions cannot inhibit decisionmaking due to
interest group domination, political influence, or idiosyncratic agency val-
ues. The problem with such decisionmaking is not the outright illegitimacy
of the interests they serve, but rather the skewed nature by which the
agency balances such interests. Such decisionmaking may promote an in-
terest that either an interest group, a politician, or the agency would favor,
but barring cases involving outright bribery, these interests are usually
within the realm that the government can legitimately seek to further.
Thus, the kind of outcome based judicial review that the legal system has
tolerated does not provide the needed constraints on agency regulation.
Congressional review of substantive outcomes of agency policymaking
is more promising. Such review has, on occasion, provided an important
check against agencies imposing idiosyncratic values via their regulatory
decisions. When EPA Administrator Burford attempted to undermine en-
forcement of environmental protection laws, Congress politically forced
President Reagan to appoint William Ruckleshaus, who had a proven track
record of supporting and enforcing the environmental laws, as Adminis-
trator.2 15  Forcing this appointment was especially noteworthy in the
Reagan administration because Reagan, more than any previous president,
216otherwise appointed agency heads who shared his regulatory vision.
Congress's response was also remarkable because the EPA had imposed its
anti-environmental values in a multitude of particular decisions such as
213. Courts have almost never reversed governmental action under the rational relation
test applied to cases that do not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights. See TRIBE,
supra note 212, at 582 (describing extreme level of deference courts have accorded Con-
gress when reviewing constitutionality of socioeconomic legislation).
214. Courts have rarely exercised this substantive outcome component of the hard look
doctrine to reverse agency decisions; judges appear to be much more comfortable reversing
decisions under the process based components of this doctrine. See Cass R. Sunstein, De-
regulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 183 [hereinafter Sunstein,
Deregulation].
215. See Mitchell, supra note 190, at 55.
216. One indication of the remarkable nature of Ruckleshaus's appointment was the fact
that, during Burford's tenure at the EPA, staff members who had close ties to Ruckleshaus
were considered untrustworthy and even slated to be removed from the agency. See LASH
ET AL., supra note 59, at 36 & n*.
1999]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
settlements with owners of particular CERCLA sites and refusals to en-
force Clean Water Act regulations. Thus, Congress did not have a single
salient agency decision that it could simply reverse.217 Congress also
proved capable of reining in the FTC's consumer protection agenda, sig-
nificantly curtailing ongoing rulemaking proceedings, eliminating the
Commission's authority to regulate children's advertising that was not de-
ceptive, and for the first time, subjecting decisions of an independent com-
mission to a legislative veto.218 Congress was even able to counter at least
one decision driven by idiosyncratic staff norms when it reversed
NHTSA's rule requiring automobile manufacturers to equip cars with seat-
belt ignition interlocks and withdrew from the agency the power to impose
ignition interlocks.
219
These examples demonstrate that congressional review of regulatory
outcomes does check against unacceptable agency decisionmaking at the
extremes. By itself, however, such review is not a sufficient check against
the problems caused by increased agency policymaking discretion. Legis-
lative inertia and the gatekeeping function of congressional committees can
prevent Congress from responding even when there is a general consensus
on the need for legislative action. 22 Moreover, because of the structure of
congressional decisionmaking, when Congress does react to agency regu-
lation, that reaction tends to be uncoordinated and responsive only to the
most vociferous interest groups.221 Fast track review, to which Congress
217. Congress's reining in of the EPA, however, was prompted at least in part by the
refusal of the Reagan administration to hand over to a congressional committee documents
relating to the EPA's handling of hazardous waste dump sites. See LASH ET AL., supra note
59, at 73-81.
218. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 59, at 191-92.
219. This reversal, however, did not alleviate other problems stemming from NHTSA's
technological focus on designing the safe car without regard to the political realities of in-
dustry resistance and consumer reaction to its regulations. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra
note 1, at 131.
220. See Seidenfeld, Big Picture Approach, supra note 101, at 10 n.54; see also
CHARLES TEIFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH,
AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 57-58 (1989) (noting that committees can bury legislation and put
spins on bills that alter their likelihood of adoption); Percival, supra note 57, at 195 (assert-
ing Congress often fails to address environmental problems for fear of harming significant
interest group). But cf Steven S. Smith & Eric D. Lawrence, Party Control of Committees
in the Republican Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 163, 188 (Lawrence C. Dodd &
Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 6th ed. 1997) (reporting that Republican majority in House of
Representatives recently changed rules to limit committee influence and to increase influ-
ence of centralized House leadership).
221. See ABERBACH, supra note 147, at 200-01 (concluding that congressional oversight
can only improve regulatory policy at margins); Morris P. Fiorina, Congressional Controls
of the Bureaucracy:. A Mismatch of Incentives and Capabilities, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED, supra note 147, at 332, 344-46 (asserting that lack of coordinated political
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now subjects all agency rules, 222 can help alleviate some of these problems
with respect to congressional oversight, but it may do so at the expense of
informed voting by members of Congress.223 And even fast track review
will not provide a means for Congress to pass judgment on every signifi-
cant agency decision affecting regulatory policies; there are simply too
many such decisions. 224 Pragmatically, fast track review most likely will
encourage Congress to consider the acceptability of rules with a major so-
cial or economic impact, in addition to rules whose effects are egregiously
inconsistent with publicly held values.
A corollary to this observation is that, even with fast track review, Con-
gress cannot effectively curtail idiosyncratic regulatory policy that results
from a multitude of small decisions. Given the limits on congressional at-
tention, no such single decision warrants congressional response. Moreo-
ver, reversal of a few such decisions is unlikely to curtail the idiosyncratic
behavior. Because Congress's focus in performing such review is the bot-
tom-line acceptability of the agency decision, 225 outcome review does not
communicate to an agency how to structure its process to ensure that sub-
sequent decisions satisfy Congress. Even repeated reversals are unlikely to
induce necessary changes in agency behavior when regulatory idiosyncracy
results from staff norms, because such norms are often deeply inculcated
and staff members usually will not identify them as the cause of the re-
peated rejection of its decisions. Hence, to get at the root of the problem,
Congress would have to fundamentally change the structure of the agency
decisionmaking process. As Congress's response to the Burford EPA il-
lustrates, when the overall impact of agency decisions is sufficiently sali-
ent, Congress will take such action. Assuming, however, that idiosyncratic
agency decisionmaking occurs with some regularity, the very notoriety of
such a congressional response indicates that such a response is exceptional.
Congressional outcome review is even less valuable as a means of pre-
venting interest group domination and minimizing undue political influence
control over bureaucracy stems from decentralized institutional structure of Congress);
Ogul, supra note 147, at 327-28 (blaming shortcomings in congressional oversight on lack
of incentives for congresspersons to engage in meaningful oversight).
222. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (Supp. III 1997).
223. See Cohen & Strauss, supra note 102, at 103 (expressing concern that volume of
rules subject to congressional review will require reliance on analysis by few staffers or
members of Congress); see also Shimburg, supra note 47, at 245-46 (noting constraints on
congressional oversight of EPA because "oversight work is detailed, complex, and tedi-
ous").
224. See Cohen & Strauss, supra note 102, at 103 (noting that current fast track review
provisions commits Congress to review over 4600 rules per year).
225. See Seidenfeld, Demystifying, supra note 39, at 512 (arguing that "bottom-line"
focus of political review limits its effectiveness in changing how agencies engage in regula-
tion).
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on agency decisions. Congress operates by the very political dealmaking
that is of questionable validity when it puts pressure on agency decisions.
Congresspersons ask for and usually obtain assignments on committees that
address agency matters crucial to their constituents or financial support-
ers.226 Classic scenarios of capture involved legislators on agency over-
sight committees forming an "iron triangle" within a "policy subsystem"
with regulated entities and regulators.227 The regulators provide monopoly
rents to the entities, which use some of the rents to fund reelection cam-
paigns for the legislators, who then ensure that the agency retains its budget
and jurisdiction. Some of the worst examples of interest group domination,
such as lack of enforcement of questionable savings and loan practices, are
closely tied to legislative involvement or at least intentional ignorance of
improper agency decisions.228 Again, one might posit that fast track re-
view, which bypasses the committee system, would provide a meaningful
check on interest group domination and improper political influence. Al-
though such review involves up-down floor votes, legislators will still have
to rely on members of oversight committee staff members, lobbyists or in-
226. See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW: DEMOCRATIC COMMITrEE
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE 231-38 (1978); C. Lawrence Evans & Walter J.
Oleszek, Congressional Tsunami? The Politics of Committee Reforms, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED, supra note 147, at 193, 197-98; Richard L. Hall & Gary J. McKissick, In-
stitutional Changes and Behavioral Choice in House Committees, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED, supra note 147, at 212, 215-16; see also Irwin N. Gertzog, The Routinaza-
tion of Committee Assignments in the US. House of Representatives, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI.
693, 704 (1976) (noting that about two-thirds of freshman representatives in 89th-91st Con-
gresses were appointed to committees they most preferred, and that almost all House mem-
bers got their desired committee assignments by their fifth year); cf Smith & Lawrence, su-
pra note 220, at 181 (reporting essential failure of House leaders' efforts to use denial of
committee assignment as punishment for freshman representative's deviation from position
of leadership on committee vote).
227. Some have questioned the current relevance of iron triangles, believing that much
of American politics is characterized by "issue networks" - open, fragmented and complex
interactions between government decision makers and interest groups. See Hugh Heclo,
Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
87, 102 (Anthony King ed., 1978). More accurately, iron triangles and issue networks rep-
resent competing idealized images of the interaction of interest groups and decisionmakers
within a policy subsystem. See James A. Thurber, Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in
American Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 114, at 323; A. Grant Jordan,
Iron Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets. Images of the Policy Process, I J.
PUB. POL'Y 95, 99-103 (1981).
228. See Edwin J. Gray, Warnings Ignored: The Politics of the Crisis, 2 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 138, 142-43 (1990); Thomas Romer & Barry R. Weingast, Congress: The
Genesis of the Thrift Crisis, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 37, 37-38 (1990); Michael Waldman,
The S&L Collapse: The Cost of a Congress for Sale, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 47, 48-50
(1990).
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dividual members of Congress for information about how to vote, 22 9 and
members are apt to trade votes on such review for others on unrelated mat-
ters. Rather than preventing domination, congressional outcome review
might exacerbate it.
Some procedural reformers have suggested that presidential oversight of
particular agency decisions is best suited to constrain administrative dis-
cretion. 23  The President can act unilaterally and therefore does not face
the problem of having to form a coalition or reach a consensus that plagues
Congress. The President also answers to the entire electorate; in theory,
therefore, he should have no incentive to placate special interest groups at
the expense of the country as a whole. Thus, some see OMB review of
agency rules as a means of alleviating regulatory paralysis without forfeit-
ing limitations on bureaucratic regulatory decisions.231 The realities of
presidential politics, however, suggest that having the White House pass on
the outcome of agency decisions suffers from some of the same problems
as review by Capitol Hill.
The number of decisions that the White House would have to review
would preclude personal review by the President or even his close aides.232
Review of major rules requires its own sub-bureaucracy within the execu-
tive office - the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
There are agency costs created by the need for low-level staff members in
OIRA to conduct the reviews; the President cannot specify in advance all
the criteria for acceptability, and he cannot screen all such staff members to
ensure that they would see regulatory issues as he does.233 Moreover, un-
229. See Cohen & Strauss, supra note 102, at 103.
230. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Proc-
ess, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1410-11 (1975); Pierce, Constitutional and Political Theory, supra
note 210, at 507-13.
231. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080-82 (1986); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
181, 188-92 (1986).
232. See GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC
LAW 103 (1991); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 557-58 (1989); Seidenfeld, Big Picture Approach, supra note
101, at 14; Percival, supra note 57, at 180.
233. See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING
THE WRONG QUESTIONS 67 (1990) (quoting one regulatory review staff member who ad-
mitted that "[s]ince I never knew what decision the president.., would have made if an is-
sue ever got to him, I had no choice but to pursue my own vision of what was good"); Mar-
garet Gilhooley, Executive Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Disclosing the Impact,
25 IND. L. REV. 299, 311 (1991); Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory
Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 451 (1987) [hereinafter McGarity, Presidential
Control].
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like agency staff members, OIRA staff members are not chosen based on
their knowledge or experience with a regulatory area; they are not neces-
sarily constrained by professional norms that make monitoring and over-
sight practicable. Hence, White House review could increase the extent to
which regulatory decisions become unpredictable.
Even if White House review did not suffer from an agency cost problem,
such review could encourage improper political influence. Imperfections
in the political process permit the President to garner political advantages
from catering to special interest groups. In what has been denoted "the rise
of candidate centered politics," most voters respond to perceptions of how
the nation as a whole has performed under an incumbent running for re-
election or on candidates' general ideologies rather than on particular deci-
sions made or policies proposed by the various candidates.234 Outcomes on
all but the most salient regulatory decisions matter only to those voters who
feel strongly about the issue. Hence, incumbents pay little price but stand
to reap substantial rewards by providing regulatory benefits to special in-
terest groups. 235 Moreover, unlike agency proceedings, political access to
the White House is restricted and conversations between presidential staff
members and interest group representatives occur behind closed doors.236
Thus, White House review might be more conducive to improper political
influence and special interest influence than is the agency proceeding.
Experience with OMB review of proposed rules is illuminating. Al-
though such review purported to weed out rules that were not cost-justified,
during the Reagan years, many criticized such review as a means of allow-
ing industry increased influence over agency rules.237 The Clinton admini-
stration has opened OMB rules review to greater public scrutiny and lim-
234. See generally MARTIN P. WATENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED
POLITICS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF THE 1980s 13-30, 130-55 (1991); see also MICHAEL
S. LEWIS-BECK, ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS: THE MAJOR WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 155-57
(1988) (concluding that voters focus on economic state of nation as whole rather than on
whether particular decisions or policies improved their personal well being); David 0. Sears
et al., Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting, 74 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 670, 679-82 (reporting that candidate's general ideology influences voters
more than his detailed economic and regulatory programs).
235. See ROBINSON, supra note 232, at 104; Percival, supra note 57, at 195.
236. See Shapiro, Political Oversight, supra note 58, at 21-23 (describing advantages in
oversight White House gains from secrecy it can maintain about outside contacts); Seiden-
feld, Big Picture Approach, supra note 101, at 46 (noting that even disclosure provisions of
President Clinton's Executive Order 12,866 still permit special interest groups to affect
rulemaking secretly via White House connections).
237. See, e.g., McGarity, Presidential Control, supra note 233, at 454-57; Alan B. Mor-
rison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation,
99 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1064-65 (1986).
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ited its application to rules with a major impact. 23  This seems to have
eliminated the most controversial special interest group influences but, by
the same token, the overall influence of OMB review has decreased under
President Clinton. Thus, one cannot easily assess whether greater openness
has reduced only the propensity of such review to foster interest group in-
fluence and improper politicking, or whether it has decreased the con-
straints such review imposes on agency rulemaking altogether. Regardless
of one's evaluation of Clinton's use of OMB rules review, experience out-
side of the rules context indicates that the mere ability to gain access to the
Clinton White House has influenced some agency decisions whether to
prosecute even egregious regulatory violations.
239
In summary, outcome review is best effectuated by the political
branches, especially Congress, rather than the courts. Given the nature of
agency decisions, however, such review can at best prevent or overrule de-
cisions that reflect an agency culture or an agency head's values egre-
giously out of sync with those of the mainstream polity. Outcome review
will do little to alleviate the threats of undue interest group and political in-
fluence, and will not likely even ameliorate more subtle biases in decisions
caused by idiosyncratic agency values.
B. Structuring Process Review
Process review can constrain agency discretion by empowering staff of-
fices outside the dominant cultures of the agency in the decisionmaking
process. Some sort of process review is needed given the limited ability of
outcome review to prevent interest group domination, undue political influ-
ence, and agency imposition of potentially idiosyncratic values. Process
review has the advantage of maintaining the agency as the ultimate deci-
sionmaker. Agencies bring to a problem technical expertise and experience
that allow them to make informed decisions efficiently. 240 Their structure
allows staff deliberation about the issues they face. They have at their dis-
238. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 646 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1994).
239. See Ralph Frommolino & Glenn F. Bunting, Penalties Averted by DNC Donor, Re-
cords Show, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1997, at Al (describing how EPA official in Washington
directed agency staffers on West Coast not to press for major fines or criminal sanctions
against developer, who had "a direct line to the White House," for ignoring Army Corps of
Engineers cease and desist order).
240. Cf Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 965, 971
(1997) (suggesting that administrative action involves intertwining of both political and sci-
entific considerations).
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posal procedures for involving the public in setting policy.241 Agencies
also ultimately answer to the political branches for the outcomes of their
decisions. Agency heads are appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate;242 executive branch agency heads are subject to
the threat of removal at the will of the President; 243 Congress can slash the
appropriations of agencies that ignore political winds. 244 In short, agencies
have the potential to engage in deliberative yet democratic decisionmak-
ng. For this reason, as well as that Congress already retains the ability
to overrule agency policy when that policy is an egregious deviation from
what the political process will tolerate, process review should not substitute
the reviewing institution's decision for that of the agency.
A significant attribute that adds to agencies' potential for deliberative
democratic decisionmaking is their ability to include in the decisionmaking
process staff members from diverse backgrounds who approach problems
241. The APA explicitly requires public notice and an opportunity for the public to
comment before an agency can issue a substantive rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997). Some advocates of a more collaborative regulatory process complain that notice
and comment procedures do not provide regulatory stakeholders with access to policy-
making at a point or in a manner conducive to deliberative consideration of public input.
See, e.g., Harter, supra note 103, at 19-23; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1997). My short answer to these com-
plaints is that it is not clear that the government can provide a more meaningful opportunity
for public involvement outside of limited contexts. I will provide a longer answer in a
forthcoming article.
242. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
243. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 610-11 (1935) (distinguishing
between members of independent agencies who perform quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
functions and whom Congress can shield from at will dismissal by President, and heads of
executive branch agencies); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690-91 (1988) (determining
bounds of Congress's power to restrict President's ability to remove agency head from of-
fice according to whether that restriction impedes President's ability to perform his consti-
tutionally appointed functions). Of course, if the President terminates an executive official
for making a decision with which the President disagrees, he pays a price in not having that
official's abilities available to make other decisions as well as a political price if the termi-
nation is seen as being for illegitimate reasons. See also Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 590, 667 n.402 (1984).
244. See PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 55-56 (1989) (describing how Congress can exercise control over agencies
via appropriations process); CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 89 (1988).
245. See Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpre-
tive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1631-41 (1985); Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note
48, at 1541.
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facing agencies from differing perspectives.246 In essence, agencies hold
the potential for implementing the conception of republican government
that Madison explained was the backbone for the Constitution: Having rep-
resentatives of one faction counteract those of another.247 Within each
agency, informed individuals who do not have a direct stake in the outcome
of their decisions discuss the decisions facing the agency with other such
individuals who may not see the problem from the same perspective and
with whom they do not share all relevant values. For this system to work,
however, representatives of all factions must be able to participate mean-
ingfully; the agency must listen to what each representative has to say with
an open mind about how it might affect the ultimate decision. Hence, the
point of process review should be to empower groups within an agency's
staff who hold alternative values to those that have traditionally dominated
an agency, and to encourage agencies to meaningfully involve offices with
a variety of backgrounds and roles in the decisionmaking process. 248
Empowerment of diverse perspectives among agency staff provides a
powerful palliative for the triple threat of domination, political influence,
and agency idiosyncracy. Staff members who see themselves aligned with
different offices, which in turn see their role as representing particular per-
spectives or interest groups affected by a decision, will not allow the
agency surreptitiously to favor one such group over another. At the very
least, the influence of staff favoring an alternative position will force the
agency to explain to such staff members how its decision comports with its
statutory mandate. Similarly, decisions made to appease political pressures
will be subjected to questioning in staff deliberations. Finally,
empowerment of diverse interest representatives on staff will ensure that
decisions do not reflect inappropriate norms applied without question.
Empowerment can guarantee that internal concerns of staff members fos-
ters external publicity.
246. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note 48, at 1555-56; see also THOMAS 0.
McGARiTY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE
FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 226 (1991) [hereinafter MCGARrTY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY]
(noting how team model of agency decisionmaking allows team members to serve as advo-
cates for particular positions).
247. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
248. -See Pedersen, supra note 112, at 59 (noting how hard look review can empower
otherwise marginalized members of agency staff). The idea of empowering non-traditional
constituencies parallels calls for doing so within corporations as a means of instilling an in-
stitutional desire to comply with regulations. Cf JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY,
CORPORATE LAWBREAKING AND INTERACTIVE COMPLIANCE: RESOLVING THE REGULATION-
DEREGULATION DICHOTOMY 154 (1991) (contending that key inducing ethic of regulatory
compliance within corporation is identifying and empowering existing "compliance con-
stituencies" such as legal departments, auditors, and safety engineers).
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Empowerment, however, should not be absolute or universal. Offices
within an agency might engage in power struggles or turf battles over con-
trol of an agency decision. In such a situation, giving each office within an
agency the power to prevent the agency from issuing a decision could sty-
mie agency decisionmaking 24 9 Conflict rather than cooperation between
various offices certainly threatens to increase the cost and delay of agency
action unnecessarily. Empowerment also should not be pro-forma. An
agency that need only include members from different offices within the
decisionmaking group without giving these members some power to influ-
ence the decision will allow the agency to ignore the input from these
members regardless of its merit.250 The extent to which the various groups
within an agency should be empowered depends on the context of the deci-
sion. Ideally, process review should force an agency to pay attention to the
views of those outside the office primarily responsible for a decision when
that office is likely to make the decision without considering whether it re-
flects values at odds with those held by mainstream society or whether the
office is unthinkingly relying on a decisionmaking norm that is inappropri-
ate for the situation. It should not force, however, the agency to reanalyze
a policy it has already adopted every time the agency applies it. In other
words, process review must depend on the details of the environment in
which the regulatory decision is made.
Direct review of agency decisionmaking processes to ensure that they
are truly deliberative is not feasible. The best one can do to ensure a delib-
erative process directly is to demand that agency procedures not exclude
certain affected interest groups a priori. Deliberation, however, depends
not only on a formal process of including various perspectives, it requires
the various members of agency staff who contribute to the ultimate deci-
sion to approach their tasks with an open mind. Questioning the state of
mind of administrators would not only be a daunting task, it would also'
greatly intrude into the communications between staff members and has the
potential to demoralize individuals whose proffers of open-mindedness are
challenged. 5
249. See McGARiTY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY, supra note 246, at 237 (concluding
that turf battles might result when agency structures its internal decisionmaking as adver-
sarial process). But cf id. at 225 (noting that success of team structure of decisionmaking,
under which OSHA operated until 1982, later led project officers to institute that structure
informally despite fact that doing so risked yielding decisionmaking turf to OSHA's Policy
Directorate).
250. See Pedersen, supra note 112, at 506-10.
251. Inquiring into whether decisionmakers who claim to have been open-minded really
were, raises concerns similar to those that arise when a court considers a claim that the rea-
sons an agency proffers for its decision are pretexts. Both inquiries require the reviewer to
question the good faith of the decisionmaker's assertion and to rely on circumstantial evi-
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Process review as currently practiced, however, instead evaluates the
reasons the agency gives for its action as an indirect means of ferreting out
212
non-deliberative decisions. By asking the agency to explain why it de-
cided as it did and why it rejected alternatives proposed to it, a reviewing
body might be able to identify those decisions over which the agency did
not deliberate.253 On review, those who challenge the decision can raise
arguments about why alternatives the agency rejected were superior, or
why the agency reasons do not make sense in light of the circumstances of
the action. The reviewer assesses whether the agency can plausibly assert
that its decision was the best available under the circumstances. If, in light
of the challenger's arguments, the reviewer finds the agency's reasons for
its decision unpersuasive, that finding may provide some indication that
those reasons are pretexts, or that the decision was not carefully thought out
when care was warranted, or that the agency did not seriously consider the
viewpoint and contention of the challenger during the decisionmaking pro-
cess.
Focusing process review on the reasons an agency proffers for a decision
increases the propensity of such review to ameliorate improper interest
group influence, undue political influence, and biases that derive from idio-
syncratic staff cultures. Such review forces the agency to state publicly
reasons for every coercive exercise of state power. This allows private in-
terest groups and the media to monitor agency decisions, and to call public
and congressional attention to those decisions seemingly at odds with the
agency's explanation.254 In addition, the requirement that an agency state
reasons necessarily trickles down to the ranks of agency personnel. If the
dence such as communications between those involved in the decision. See, e.g., United
States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 420-22 (1941). Such inquiries not only are likely to prove
unfruitful, they could adversely affect the very deliberative process review is meant to fos-
ter. See Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 Mo.
L. REV. 279, 286-90 (1989) (describing how courts developed privilege for deliberative
communications between agency personnel to avoid chilling open and frank discussion
among government officials necessary to maintain quality of agency decisionmaking);
Rossi, Mass Participation, supra note 37, at 236 (noting propensity for sunshine laws to in-
terfere with agencies abilities to engage in deliberative decisionmaking).
252. See Seidenfeld, Demystifying, supra note 39, at 491-92; Sunstein, Deregulation,
supra note 214, at 181-83.
253. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 63-64 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups] (asserting that judges have used
hard-look doctrine to ensure agency deliberation).
254. Monitoring by having interest groups complain to Congress when an agency deci-
sion that they think unjustified harms them has come to be known as "fire alarm" monitor-
ing. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Politi-
cal Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 250-55 (1987) (coining phrase "fire alarm
monitoring" and arguing that judicial enforcement of administrative process requirements
generally foster such monitoring).
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agency ultimately needs a reason for its decision, then staff members re-
sponsible for choices along the path to the ultimate decision will have to
provide reasons for their choices. Such reasons, in turn, facilitate moni-
toring by the political appointees at the apex of the agency structure to en-
sure against professional staff biases.
That process review is structured as oversight of an agency's announced
reasons for its decisions, suggests that courts are better suited than Con-
gress or the President to perform such review.255 Politics, and therefore the
branches most subject to its pressures, tends to focus more on the bottom-
line acceptability of a decision rather than on the process of reaching the
decision or the reasons for it. Appellate judges, by contrast, regularly
evaluate the reasoning process by which lower courts develop legal doc-
trine. They are trained to think critically and find gaps and flaws in argu-
ments. Also, courts are likely to give better feedback to agencies about the
shortcomings of the agency decisionmaking process, because unlike the
political branches, courts must give reasons for their own decisions. Some
have contended that courts are too fragmented to give a consistent message
to agencies about what is required for agency decisions to pass judicial
muster.25 6 Certainly individual judicial decisions are not all consistent. In-
consistency, however, does not necessarily imply incoherence. Judicial
opinions discuss previous cases and explain why the court differed from the
outcome seemingly dictated by such cases. Often one judge will empha-
size a factor in a decision that another judge would find insignificant. The
extent to which judicial opinions explain how judges choose these different
emphases mollifies the extent to which inconsistent decisions leave the
agency confused about what the courts might require.
One can argue that the potential for judges with varying concerns to fo-
cus on different factors actually improves the effect of review on agency
decisionmaking. Review of agency reasoning has a substantive as well as
process component: At some point the reviewer must be able to reject the
255. Viewing judicial review as a means of empowering various offices within agency
staff is consistent with Cary Coglianese's recent finding that interest groups with the most
extensive and long standing relationships with agency staff bring most environmental rules
challenges. Cary Coglianese, Litigation within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbances in
the Regulatory Process, 30 LAW & Soc'y REv. 735, 743-44 (1996). Coglianese explains
that the this type of litigation hardly disturbs the relationship between the interest group
challenger and staff and provides a means for the interest group to continue bargaining with
the agency about the rule the agency finally adopts. See id. at 757. According to my view,
an interest groups can use such litigation to increase the influence of staff members who
represents the group's perspective in internal agency deliberations.
256. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1252 n.68 (1989).
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agency reasons as simply implausible. 2" Determinations of the plausibility
of any particular set of reasons will likely vary with the ideology and back-
ground of the reviewer. This suggests that having a single person review
all agencies' decisions could induce a bias toward the ideological prefer-
ences of that individual in the agency decisionmaking process. In fact, re-
viewers should not themselves be experts on the matters under review, as
review by experts would remove incentives for the agency to counter the
258biases of similar experts in its decisionmaking structure. Potential re-
view by any one of a multitude of generalists, all of whom may bring their
own preconceptions to the regulatory problem, adds uncertainty to the
agency's ability to predict which factors the reviewer will find significant,
and what values the reviewer will bring to bear on its evaluation of the
agency decision. The agency's inability to predict the perspective from
which the reviewer will view the decision will encourage the agency to vet
the reasons for its decisions before staff members and members of the pub-
lic with a wide range of ideological viewpoints.
Reformers who call for deossification of agency decisionmaking remind
us that encouraging input from those with varying perspectives is not a
costless blessing. There is a need to balance the extent to which such input
can reduce unwise or illegitimate agency decisions against the increased
cost of forcing an agency explicitly to consider decisionmaking criteria that
often lead most efficiently to good decisions. The above analysis, how-
ever, suggests that process review is a crucial component in ensuring that
the vast administrative state that is the government today regulates in pur-
suit of the public interest embodied in the public's understanding and ac-
ceptance of the bases for agencies' authority.25 9 In light of this conclusion,
257. Court applying the hard look doctrine have, on occasion, simply reversed the
agency decision as implausible. See, e.g., California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1231-38 (9th
Cir. 1990) (concluding that rulemaking record did not support FCC's determination that
benefits of eliminating structural separations for Bell Operating Companies justified harms
that might result from such elimination); Building & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Brock, 838
F.2d 1258, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that OSHA's ban on spraying of asbestos prod-
ucts was not supported by rulemaking record); cf Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 214, at
183 (noting that hard look doctrine includes substantive review component but that courts
are loathe to rely on that component to reverse agency decisions).
258. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking
System, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 , 1139-53 (1989) (contending that specialized courts will
bias review in favor of agency); Bruff, Specialized Courts, supra note 87, at 331 (recogniz-
ing that costs of review by specialized courts include loss of cross-fertilization of insights
from different disciplines and propensity to exaggerate importance of professionally paro-
chial issues).
259. See Wald, Judicial Review, supra note 110, at 228 (citing agency capture as one of
reasons for rebirth of increased judicial scrutiny in 1960s-1970s); Sunstein, Interest Groups,
supra note 253, at 61-64 (citing "hard-look doctrine" as most important doctrinal innovation
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the best manner for reducing the inefficiencies of the regulatory process
would not be to abandon process review altogether, but rather to structure
such review so that it does not encourage an agency to perform analyses for
its own sake, or respond to every contention raised in opposition to the
agency's decision.
260
CONCLUSION
Recent perceptions that agencies are mired in a regulatory quagmire
have prompted calls for increased flexibility allowing agencies to deviate
from rules and to escape meaningful review of the reasons for their deci-
sions. Contrary to popular belief, however, agencies have significant lee-
way to deviate from rules they have adopted or even those imposed on
them by statute. Agencies can grant waivers to rules, can refuse to prose-
cute violations, and can negotiate cooperative or not-so-cooperative solu-
tions to regulatory problems that avoid perverse outcomes in particular
situations. Any additional discretion to deviate from rules threatens to up-
set the balance between the need to ensure political accountability of agen-
cies and the need for flexibility. In some instances, the trend of the legisla-
tive and executive branches to micromanage agency decisionmaking has
increased the difficulty agencies face when tailoring regulatory responses
to particular circumstances, but such micromanagement by itself has not
created a regulatory crisis.
Internal agency norms also contribute to regulatory inflexibility. Bu-
reaucracies, such as agencies, tend to rely on such norms to make decisions
efficiently and effectively. But, internal norms can lead agencies into deci-
sionmaking ruts, and with respect to political matters, can generate deci-
sions that reflect parochial values of regulators or undue influence of spe-
cial interest groups or powerful politicians. Moreover, it is almost
impossible to specify ex ante criteria for decisions that will correct misuse
of decisionmaking norms within agencies.
The problem of the perverse effects of decisionmaking norms, especially
in political arenas, suggests that the solution lies in including representa-
tives of various perspectives in the internal decisionmaking process of the
agencies. To include such representatives in a meaningful, rather than pro-
forma manner, however, requires ex-post review of agency decisions. Such
review, moreover, is best accomplished by allowing courts to review agen-
cies' reasons for their decisions, much as courts currently do. Ex-post re-
view does add costs to the decisionmaking process. The analysis in this
in administrative law and further stating that its effect is to ensure that agencies do more
than just respond to political clout and pressure).
260. See Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-Bureaucratic Deci-
sionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REv. 559, 567 (1997).
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article suggests, however, that reformers of regulation would spend their
time more productively trying to structure judicial review to minimize such
costs rather than advocating for agencies to have carte blanche to ignore
rules and not have to answer for particular regulatory decisions they make.

